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Abstract 
 
This dissertation broadly explores the use of panel data methods for identifying the effects 
of regulation. Chapter 1 applies dynamic panel models to control for potential feedback effects 
when examining the relationship between environmental regulations and firm performance. 
Specifically, this chapter uses data from the U.S. manufacturing industry to explore the effects of 
the Clean Air Act (CAA) on firm performance outcomes related to profitability, employment, and 
capital expenditures. The evidence suggests that feedback effects are present in the data and, more 
critically, appropriately modeling these effects can alter conclusions regarding the effects of 
environmental regulation. 
Chapter 2 uses panel data logit-class models to analyze whether the stringency of 
environmental regulation motivates mergers among regulated firms. Using comprehensive data set 
that capture both environmental and financial behaviors from a variety of data sources, results in 
this chapter provide new evidence on the impact of environmental regulation on manufacturing 
firm M&A activities, suggesting that more stringent environmental regulation (CAA) will motive 
manufacturing firms conduct more M&As, and market value of M&A firms will increase.    
In Chapter 3, my coauthor and I use Monte Carlo experiments to provide insight on how  
power is influenced by data analysis methods, such as the choice of econometric estimator or 
whether all or a subset of data is used. Surprisingly, except in very few extreme cases, we find that 
power does not vary much if one relies on simple difference-of-means tests or instead on robust 
or structured (i.e. assumption-laden) panel data estimation. However, the simulations provide 
strong evidence of power loss when uses a subset of the collected data, and power gains through 
the inclusion of non-experimental control variables (e.g. demographic variables). 
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Introduction 
This dissertation broadly explores the use of panel data methods for identifying the effects 
of regulation. Panel data methods have been widely used in economic analysis. Relative to cross-
section data, the analysis of panel data provides opportunities for better identification when 
omitted variables are a concern. Moreover, panel data provides opportunities to explore important 
dynamic relationships. Chapter 1 applies dynamic panel models to control for potential feedback 
effects when examining the relationship between environmental regulations and firm performance. 
Previous empirical studies have treated regulation intensity as exogenous, and find that more 
stringent environmental regulations negatively impact firm performance measures such as profits. 
However, theoretical research suggests that potential feedback effects exist in the sense that the 
stringency of environmental regulations may be endogenous to firm performance, and further that 
such feedback effects may positively affect firm performance. Specifically, this chapter uses data 
from the U.S. manufacturing industry to explore the effects of the Clean Air Act (CAA) on firm 
performance outcomes related to profitability, employment, and capital expenditures. The 
evidence suggests that feedback effects are present in the data and, more critically, appropriately 
modeling these effects can alter conclusions regarding the effects of environmental regulation. 
Empirical results support the notion that more stringent environmental policies can provide 
dividends to regulated firms. 
Chapter 2 uses panel data logit-class models to analyze whether the stringency of 
environmental regulation motivates mergers among regulated firms. Extant theoretical analyses 
studying how environmental regulation affects merger and acquisition decisions suggest that 
polluting firms have more incentives to cooperate under more stringent environmental regulations. 
Coincident with this, although the related empirical literature is sparse, the common finding is that 
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the likelihood of mergers increases with stringency. These studies have ignored the effects of 
financial characteristics such as stock market return and market/book ratio, however, which are 
commonly found in the finance literature to be important determinants of mergers. As such, this 
chapter uses insights from both the environmental economics literature and the broader finance 
literature to investigate whether existing findings are sensitive to the omission of these key 
financial variables. Firm-level panel data models are estimated using merged data from 
COMPUSTAT/CRSP, Securities Data Corporation (SDC), PACE, and NEI. Results in this chapter 
provide new evidence on the impact of environmental regulation on manufacturing firm M&A 
activities, suggesting that more stringent environmental regulation (CAA) will motive 
manufacturing firms conduct more M&As, and market value of M&A firms will increase. 
An increasingly common approach for identifying the effects of potential and existing 
policy interventions is to use randomized experiments. As highlighted by some high-profile 
articles (e.g. Maniadis, Tefano and List, 2014), one often ignored yet important consideration when 
analyzing data from randomized experiments is statistical power: the ability to reject a false null 
hypothesis. In Chapter 3, my coauthor and I use Monte Carlo experiments to provide insight on 
how the power of statistical tests based on panel data methods compares with more traditional (and 
simple) parametric and non-parametric tests commonly used by researchers when analyzing data 
from randomized experiments. Further, we compare the power across a class of panel data 
estimators that vary in terms of the structure imposed on the model. Surprisingly, except in some 
extreme cases, we find that power does not vary much if one relies on simple difference-of-means 
tests or instead on robust or structured (i.e. assumption-laden) panel data estimation. However, the 
simulations provide strong evidence of power loss when uses a subset of the collected data, and 
power gains through the inclusion of non-experimental control variables (e.g. demographic 
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variables). Although the structured panel estimator we explore (random effects model), which 
adheres to the underlying data generating process, is in fact the most efficient according to the 
simulations, we find considerable evidence of bias in small samples. The extent of the bias, in 
combination with small efficiency gains, suggests that other approaches may be more appropriate 
in some settings. Although focused on data from randomized experiments, the results are also 
informative for the analysis of observational panel data using quasi-experimental identification 
approaches. 
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Chapter 1: Re-examining the Relationship between Environmental 
Regulations and Firm Performance: Evidence from a Dynamic Panel Model 
of the U.S. Manufacturing Sector 
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Abstract: 
An important empirical question for both policy makers and firms is whether more 
stringent environmental regulations have positive or negative impacts on firm performance. In 
order to gain new insight on this question, and in contrast to related work, this chapter employs 
dynamic panel models that allow for potential feedback effects (i.e. reverse causality) between 
measures of performance and regulation. Specifically, this chapter uses data from the U.S. 
manufacturing industry to explore the effects of the Clean Air Act (CAA) on firm performance 
outcomes related to profitability, employment, and capital expenditures. The evidence suggests 
that feedback effects are present in the data and, more critically, appropriately modeling these 
effects can alter conclusions regarding the effects of environmental regulation. Empirical results 
support the notion that more stringent environmental policies can provide dividends to regulated 
firms. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
An important empirical question for both policy makers and firms is whether more 
stringent environmental regulations have positive or negative impacts on firm performance. 
Accumulated empirical evidence suggests that increasing environmental regulation has tended to 
negatively affect firms in terms of profitability, employment and capital expenditures. Such a result 
is consistent with traditional economic theories that mainly consider the short-run costs of 
regulation. However, the so-called Porter Hypothesis (Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 
1995) challenged such conventional wisdom by considering benefits and costs systematically, 
asserting that more stringent but well-designed environmental regulation could generate net private 
benefits for firms. The basic intuition is that managers have present-biased preferences, which 
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serves to retard the adoption of expensive but more efficient green technology, while 
environmental regulation forces them to correct such preferences (Ambec and Barla, 2006). In 
addition, if there are opportunities such as better access to green markets and product 
differentiation, this can serve to enhance the private benefits from environmental regulations 
(Ambec and Lanoie, 2008).  
The theoretical model underlying the Porter Hypothesis implies that potential dynamic 
feedback effects (i.e. reverse causalities) exist. The basic intuition is as follows. Changes in the 
regulatory status affect production costs and incentivize firms to re-optimize by innovating more 
on green technology. On the flipside, economic activity typically correlates with pollution, which 
affects the intensity of environmental regulations. Econometric work by Chamberlain (1993), Ahn 
and Schmidt (1995), Chay and Hyslop (1998), and Wooldridge (2000) suggest that exogeneity 
assumption about conditioning variables will cause bias when dynamic feedback effects are 
present but ignored. If dynamic feedback effects are in fact present in the relationship between 
environmental regulation and firm performance, this calls into question any analysis that ignores 
these effects. 
Previous empirical work on environmental regulation, summarized in Table 1-1, has 
neglected possible feedback effects. Most studies employ static econometric models, and identify 
regulation effects using: (1) simple regressions (Greenstone 2002, Greenstone et al. 2012); (2) 
propensity matching estimates (List et al. 2003); and (3) difference-in-difference estimation 
(Holladay 2010). Negative effects of environmental regulations dominate the results. 1  A few 
                                              
1 The magnitudes and the significance levels are small, some even find no impacts. The major problem in those 
estimators is ignoring the feedback effects. The first two methods could help address the endogenous problem to some 
degree. Even so, in Greenstone (2002), only estimator based on CO is significant . Later research by Holladay (2010) 
discusses that it may due to firms transferring from non-attainment to attainment, which leads to concerns about the 
main limitation of the empirical methodology, the feedback problem. 
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studies have considered dynamics but ignore possible endogeneity issues.2 For example, Lanoie et 
al. (2008) empirically study the dynamic effect of regulation on manufacturing by adding time lags 
of regulation, while Greenstone (2002) applies a dynamic model by including the lag of dependent 
variable as a robustness check for the simple static regression models. Similar results to those from 
static analyses are found. 
Distinct from earlier empirical work, this chapter uses two-step system Generalized 
Methods of Moments (GMM) estimation of dynamic panel models that address potential feedback 
effects by treating measures of regulation as endogenous. In particular, using county-level data 
from the U.S. manufacturing industry, this chapter explores the effects of the Clean Air Act (CAA) 
on firm performance outcomes such as profitability, employment and capital expenditures.3 For 
each county, manufacturing profitability is measured by return on sales (ROS), real profits, and 
value added. Under the CAA, regulatory stringency increases based on increases in pollution 
activity.4 For example, counties with pollution levels above regulatory standards are often required 
to adopt particular abatement technologies, which would then affect future regulatory status. 
Further, when firms are in counties in attainment status, they have a relative cost advantages, which 
can serve to incentivize increased production and pollution, and possible lead to a violation of 
                                              
2 From industrial organizational theory, Ericson and Pakes (1995) provide a formal framework allowing feedback 
effects in dynamic competition model. Ryan (2012) recovers the entire cost structure of U.S. Portland cement industry 
by adopting the Ericson and Pakes (1995) framework. He finds that static analysis would obtain wrong sign of the 
welfare effects on incumbent firms. 
3 Employment and capital are two key elements of firm’s decision making process, so similar to previous literature; 
this study includes them to shed light on the environmental regulatory impacts more broadly under the same dynamic 
feedback effects framework. More importantly, results based upon these two variables show that feedback effects do 
present in the data. 
4  In the United States, the CAA requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to set ambient pollution 
standards for airborne pollutants such as ozone, sulfur dioxide (SO2), and carbon dioxide (CO2) to every locale. EPA 
designates the regulatory status to every county annually according to those standards, p roviding variations in 
regulatory stringency that fit the purpose of the study. Counties whose pollution levels are above the standards are 
under non-attainment status with more stringent regulation than those under attainment status. 
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regulatory standards. Exploiting county-level panel data compiled from Economic Census and 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), panel dynamic models that allow for feedback effects 
can capture such dynamics appropriately. 
The evidence of this chapter suggests that feedback effects are present in the data and, more 
critically, appropriately modeling these effects can alter conclusions regarding the effects of 
environmental regulation and lend support to the Porter Hypothesis. Ignoring feedback effects, the 
estimates of regulatory impacts from simple panel dynamic models are negative and not significant 
in the ROS equation, which is similar to extant estimates from naïve static panel models. However, 
the estimates are positive and significant when the potential feedback effects are considered. On 
average, non-attainment status leads to an annual increase in ROS by about 1.5 percentage points. 
Similar results are obtained when using different measurements of profitability, emphasizing the 
importance of feedback effects in the estimation. For real profits, dynamic feedback effects models 
show that CAA non-attainment status could increase profits by about 250 million in 2005 dollars, 
compared to a loss about 634 million from a naïve static model. More stringent CAA regulation 
increases value added by about 47 million in 2005 dollars, rather than a loss of 261 million implied 
by static models. Although no significant impacts of CAA regulation on employment growth or 
capital expenditures are found, signs of estimated coefficients are switched from negative to 
positive when dynamic feedback effects are considered, providing some suggestive evidence of 
feedback effects. 
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1.2 Background 
1.2.1 Feedback Effects: Intuition and Theoretical Background 
Underlying dynamics indicated by the Porter Hypothesis suggest feedback effects. 
Intuitively, feedback effects exist because of mutual influences between environmental regulations 
and production processes, as in the supply-and-demand system. In the case of environmental 
regulations under CAA, the regulatory status is determined by whether a county’s ambient 
pollution exceeds one of the ambient thresholds established for criterion pollutants, where the 
thresholds acts as the equilibrium price in supply-and-demand model. If the pollution levels exceed 
the standards, then firms therein will be found with more stringent regulation, thus in turn affect 
the production cost of firms. Most of the previous empirical studies assume the regulatory status 
is exogenous to firms and use quasi-experimental design methods by constructing counterfactuals 
of regulated and unregulated counties. However, with changes in production costs, firms can either 
change the level of production or production technology, and either of these changes will affect 
the byproduct, the pollution that ultimately affect the regulatory status. Thus, the process starts 
over again, leading to the existence of feedback effects. 
Theoretically, both environmental regulations and economic performance could be 
endogenous. Most previous literatures adopt static analyses without considering the dynamic 
property of Porter Hypothesis.5 Contrast to static studies, Xepapadeas and Zeeuw (1999) notice 
                                              
5 The focus of those static studies is to find out why the firms not choose the more efficient production frontier by 
themselves if there is indeed an opportunity of producing with higher efficiency. This is the main doubt against the 
Porter Hypothesis. Two sets of literature using static models over the last 20 years provide some insights to answer 
the question. The one set focuses on the organizational and behavioral economics, pointing out that the limited 
rationality of the firm is driven by its manager present-biased preferences. Due to the present-biased preferences of 
managers, Ambec and Barla (2006) argue that managers tend to postpone any costly investments in innovation of 
abating pollution. However, environmental regulations force managers to change their self-control problem, which 
enhances firm profits. The other set turns back to study the firms' profit maximization problem. Andre et al. (2009) 
show that a minimum standard for environmental product quality might benefit all firms under a setting where there 
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the importance of dynamic behaviors behind environmental regulations and production decisions. 
They analyze the impact of emission tax on the dynamics of a representative firm’s  choice of 
capital expenditures, showing that the environmental regulations will lead to an increase in average 
productivity. In addition, there are two strands of dynamic analyses recently: (1) how transitory 
environmental policy can engender permanent changes in the sustainability of economic 
performance; (2) how transitory fluctuations in productivity over time interact with the 
performance of environmental policies. On one hand, the model about effects of environmental 
regulation on manufacturing performance follows the Xepapadeas (2005) model allowing 
endogenous technological growth. The planning problem is to maximize utility by choosing 
optimal consumption and pollution level. Xepapadeas (2005) shows that with the introduction of 
the abatement, it is possible to have sustained economic growth in the long run, if there is 
increasing return on pollution abatement. On the other hand, Heutel (2012) argues from the other 
direction: the effects of an exogenous productivity shock on the performance of environmental 
policies. He proposes a dynamic programming model by including pollution and abatement, and 
treats productivity shock as exogenous. And he finds that the optimal emissions are higher when 
there are positive productivity shocks, as a result, he argues that the optimal environmental policies 
like the emission taxes or quotas should be more stringent in responding to such positive 
technology shocks.  
However, these models account for only one part of the underlying dynamic interactions 
between environmental regulation and economic performance. Combining those two together 
                                              
is imperfect competition in differentiated products. In short, environmental regulations allow them to reach a Pareto-
improving equilibrium. Lambertini and Tampieri (2012) replace Bertrand with Cournot behavior, and then argue that 
a Porter-type result takes place only within a certain region. 
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leads to feedback effects. Heutel and Fischer (2013) clearly point out that ignoring the interactions 
between environmental policies and economic performance risks overlooking the feedback effects.  
1.2.2 CAA and the Porter Hypothesis 
CAA is the most fundamental air pollutants regulation in the United States, and it is widely 
studied because it provides rich regulatory variations. Under CAA, Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) sets ambient pollution levels of different air pollutants, classifying U.S. counties 
into two categories based on the standards: counties whose pollution levels are below the standards 
will be designated as in attainment; otherwise will be in non-attainment. Counties in non-
attainment are required to develop a State Implementation Plan (SIP) to reduce pollution below 
the EPA standards; both new and existing establishments are subjected to stricter regulations than 
those in counties in attainment. For example, new establishments in non-attainment counties are 
required to obey “lowest achievable emissions rate" rule, with no reference to cost, while those in 
attainment counties are required to implement “best available control technologies". If firms in 
attainment counties do not adopt control technologies voluntarily, higher probability will be that 
they are forced to implement higher-requirement technology after being regulated, thus regulation 
is endogenous, and feedback effects exist. In addition to introduce dynamic feedback effects, the 
designation of regulatory status under CAA generates rich variations in regulation among and 
within county. Since different counties may have different regulatory status, and a county in 
different years may be designated into different status dynamically as well.  
Therefore, CAA fits the purpose of testing the Porter Hypothesis. The basic idea of the 
Porter Hypothesis is that more stringent environmental regulations will lead to win-win situations, 
where both social welfare and net benefits of firms will be increased. In order to test the Porter 
Hypothesis, variations in the degree of regulatory stringency are fundamental. A number of 
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studies, including Greenstone (2002), List et al. (2003), Holladay (2010), and Greenstone et al.  
(2012), etc., take advantages of regulation variations from CAA. In addition, the use of the CAA 
regulations should get rid of the concerns in Jaffe et al. (1995) about too aggregated measures of 
regulation (e.g., state-level measures) to detect the differences in stringency. Moreover, CAA 
regulatory variations also overcome the shortcomings of using abatement costs to measure 
stringency, under which it might be the case where inefficient firms spend more while under 
similar regulatory situations. This chapter is the first to study CAA effects on U.S. manufacturing 
by allowing for dynamic feedback effects in panel dynamic models. 
 
1.3 Empirical Methods 
1.3.1 Data  
The main data sources are the Economic Census data containing county-level 
manufacturing performance with SIC/NAICS information about sub industries under 
manufacturing sector,6 and the Greenbook from EPA showing the regulatory status of counties 
over years 1978 to 2012. The Economic Census data comes from surveys conducted every five 
years, and include data on the manufacturing value of shipments, value added, employment, 
payroll, costs of materials, new capital expenditures, production workers, and the number of 
establishments of each county.7 Industrial classification information is included as well. For year 
1982, 1987, and 1992, the industrial classification was based on SIC, after 1992, it was based on 
NAICS. In the final data, all NAICS codes are converted to SIC based on the SIC-NAICS 
                                              
6 The Economic Census is the U.S. Governments’ official five-year measure of American business and economy. Is 
it conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, and response is required by law. 
7 More details about the variable definitions can be found in Appendix A. 
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comparison information from Economic Census. The Greenbook contains regulatory status of 
specific pollutants, including 1-hr Ozone, 8-hr Ozone, CO, PM10, PM2.5, and SO2. 8 When 
identifying separate regulatory effects of different pollutants, this chapter combines 1-hr Ozone 
and 8-hr Ozone as Ozone, PM2.5 and PM10 as PM. The raw data contains 3128 counties from 
reporting years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012, with gaps and missing values in 
key variables, especially the dependent variables. The missing values appear to be unrelated to 
county characteristics or reporting years. Necessarily omitting observations with missing data, the 
estimation sample consists of at most 2601 counties, each with up to 6 observation years. 
Three sets of indicator variables are constructed to capture potential size effects, industry 
effects, and time effects.9 Different manufacturing sizes may have different behaviors, similar to 
Greenstone (2002), manufacturing size of each county in each survey year is classified into four 
categories based on the value of shipments: below the median, between the median and the 75th 
percentile, above the 75th percentile but below the mean, greater than mean. Table 1-2 presents 
summary statistics of total manufacturing shipments for each county, and there seems to be clear 
patterns as over time, and thus time dummies are created to capture time fixed effects. 
Additionally, to distinguish polluted industries from clean ones, this chapter uses SIC information 
and 12 polluting industries classified in Greenstone (2002) and List (2003) to generate 13 industry 
dummies, 12 for the polluted industries, one additional for the remaining clean industry. The 
                                              
8 There are additional two pollutants that are reported in Greenbook: lead and NO2, but very few counties are under 
non-attainment for those two, 58 and 24 counties separately. Besides, CAA, especially the 1970 amendments focused 
more on the high concentrations in CO, SO2, O3and TSPs, so this chapter focuses on regulations on these four.  
9 Including size and industry dummies could control for the entry-exit effects that may affect the estimates. Intuitively, 
firms may sort automatically into attainment counties to get rid of higher abatement costs, thus the manufacturing 
sizes and the structure of industries components may change over time. Controlling size and industry dummies could 
help eliminate some of the entry-exit effects. In addition, including 13 industry dummies could also distinguish 
polluted industries from clean ones, making the estimates of CAA effects more precise than treating them all as the 
same. Refer to Appendix B for more discussions about the entry-exit effect. 
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classification of 12 polluting industries is based on the emission reports from EPA, and these 12 
industries emit different combination of air pollutants, which may cause them face different 
requirements under same regulatory status. These 12 industries (with SIC) are: Printing 2711-89, 
Organic Chemicals 2861-9, Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 30, Fabricated Metals 34, 
and Motor Vehicles, Bodies, and Parts 371, for emitting O3 ; Inorganic Chemicals 2812-9 for 
emitting SO2; Lumber and Wood Products 24 for emitting TSPs; Nonferrous Metals 333-4 for 
CO/SO2 ; Petroleum Refining 2911 for CO/SO2 /O3 ; Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete 32 for 
SO2 / O3 /TSPs; and Pulp and Paper 2611-31, Iron and Steel 3312-3 and 3321-5 for 
CO/SO2/O3/TSPs. 
Since the data are collected every five years, while the designation of regulatory status is 
determined annually, this chapter follows Greenstone (2002) and assigns the attainment/non-
attainment status for each five-year period based on the first year of the period. This is a reasonable 
approximation as technological development is likewise a slow process, and it takes time to have 
the status changed from one to another, especially when one county is under non-attainment status. 
The data show that the average time it takes to move from non-attainment to attainment status is 
about 14 years. One of the key variables, profitability, can be measured by return on sales (ROS) 
and level of profits from previous literature. Additionally, this chapter analyses value added, for 
which the data directly comes from Economic Census. Consistent findings are obtained from 
different measurements of profitability, which enhance the final results about the importance of 
feedback effects.  
The industrial organization literature has identified capital intensity and market share as 
two important variables that affect a firm’s profitability (Geroski et al., 1993; Machin and Reenen, 
1993; Goddard et al., 2005). Capital intensity is calculated as the proportion of capital expenditures 
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divided by the total value of shipments. Market share is measured as the proportion of a county’s 
shipments divided by total shipments of all counties. Table 1-3 contains descriptive statistics of 
key variables. As there are a large number of counties, the manufacturing market share is relatively 
small for each county. What is more, value added is greater than profit on average, because of the 
inclusion of inventories. Employment growth rate is calculated by natural log of current 
employment minus natural log of previous employment, which is commonly used as calculation 
of growth rate. On average, there is 0.52% decrease in employment growth from 1982 to 2007.  
1.3.2 Estimation Framework 
In order to address dynamic feedback effects, this chapter employs dynamic panel models. 
The omnibus econometric model specification I explore is given by: 
[1.1]                         𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜌𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜽𝒛𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝒙𝒊𝒕 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 , (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable; 𝒛𝒊𝒕 are regulatory status indicators for four pollutants (PM, 
Ozone, CO, and SO2); 𝒙𝒊𝒕 is a vector of control variables, including size and industry indicators; 
the 𝑐𝑖 are county fixed effects; the 𝛾𝑡 are time fixed effects; and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is a mean-zero error term. 
Lagged dependent variables are unlikely to meet standard strict exogeneity assumptions, 
given correlation with unit fixed effects and, if there are serially correlated, the model error term. 
That is to say, even when one can ignore possible feedback/simultaneity between regulation and 
firms performance there is nevertheless an endogeneity concern and an instrumental varialbles 
approach is needed. A common approach is to use panel-style instruments (i.e. instruments that 
are time-period specific) based on lagged values and lagged first-differences of the (potentially) 
endogenous variable with a GMM estimation framework (for efficiency). This approach relies on 
the assumption that these lagged values are predetermined in the sense that they are uncorrelated 
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with the current and future period errors. Arellano and Bond (1991) provide an example of treating 
employment as predetermined and estimate the dynamic employment equations with GMM.  
A predetermined variable by definition is not correlated with current or future values of the 
error term, but there may be some correlations between the lagged error and lagged dependent 
variable due to feedback effects. If  𝑦𝑖𝑡−1  is considered predetermined, this means that 
E(𝑦𝑡−𝑠𝑣𝑖𝑡) = 0  for 𝑡 = 2, … , 𝑇; 𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑇 − 1 . Because of the feedback effects, variables 
capturing difference in regulation intensity are potentially predetermined as well. A county’s 
regulatory status is determined by its pollution concentrations, which are determined by the 
manufacturing activities. Thus, the current regulatory status may have mechanical correlation with 
the lagged unobserved components of manufacturing activities (the error terms) or the lagged 
manufacturing activities (the dependent variables).10 Then for all𝑠 ≤ 𝑡, E(𝒛𝒊𝒔𝑣𝑖𝑡) = 0, and this 
allows potential feedback effects on 𝒛𝒊𝒕 from lagged 𝑣𝑖𝑡 or lagged𝑦𝑖𝑡. 
In order to identify the panel dynamic model, a two-step system GMM estimators defined 
by available moments of the level and first-differenced errors is implemented. Comparing to 
difference GMM and one-step system GMM, two-step system GMM is more efficient and robust, 
since the optimal weighting matrices are corrected, so that the statistical tests are more reliable 
(Windmeijer, 2005; Roodman, 2013). Proper instruments for the predetermined variables are 
needed. Such instruments can be obtained within the model, more specifically, from the 
                                              
10 There may be concerns about weather patterns and wind that will affect the pollution concentrations of a certain 
county, but it will not affect the predetermined property of the regulatory status. If we think about the regulatory status 
as a linear function of manufacturing activities, those factors will affect the coefficient of the function, but will not cut 
the correlation out unless the coefficient becomes zero. Previous literature only finds one county that does not have 
firms produce o-zone pollutants but with high-level of such pollutants. However, there are five more pollutants that 
are regulated by EPA, so the coefficient is hardly to be zero. So it is reasonable to treat the weather factors as 
unobservable errors, which will not dramatically change the predetermined regulatory status of a county into a non-
predetermined variable. 
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predetermined variables themselves. A rich set of instruments includes either the lagged level 
predetermined variables based on first-difference equation, or the lagged first-difference 
predetermined variables based on level equation. Some of the instruments may not be valid if the 
error term is serially correlated, after dropping those invalid instruments, there are still rich enough 
instruments for estimation. This chapter carefully selects a set of instruments that is contingent on 
the tests of instruments validity. Related specification tests are: the Arellano-Bond test of 
autocorrelation, Hansen over-identification tests provide tests of the model specification. More 
specifically, in order to get rid of the first-order autocorrelation and over-identification problems, 
we make the instruments for predetermined variables start from the third lag when applying GMM 
dynamics. When estimating the GMM dynamic with feedback effects, in addition to the same set 
of instruments as GMM dynamics, all the regulatory indicators are treated as predetermined, so 
the GMM-type instruments starting with the first lag are also included. More details are given in 
Appendix C. Moreover, Hausman type test shed light on whether regulatory status is indeed 
endogenous or not. Baum et al. (2003) and Roodman (2013) provide details of these tests.  
For comparison purposes, specifications characteristic of previous work in this area are 
included. Models 1 – 4 are estimated using standard fixed effects procedures. Model 1 and Model 
2 are static models, with the difference being that the latter model includes time fixed effects. 
Model 3 and Model 4 add one-period lag of the dependent variable. Model 3 is close to the 
robustness check in Greenstone (2002). Models 5 – 8 are estimated using system GMM. Model 5 
and Model 6 treat the one-period lag of the dependent variable as predetermined. Finally, Model 
7 and Model 8 treat both the one-period lag of dependent variable as well as regulatory status as 
predetermined variables. Comparisons across models distinguish whether simple dynamics or 
dynamic feedback effects matter the most in identifying the regulatory impacts. I note that Lanoie 
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et al. (2008) include lags of regulatory status to see whether there is long-run effects of regulation. 
I also explored models with one-period lag of regulatory status and found that this has little effect 
on the results. In all cases, exclusion of this lag is statistically justified. This finding might due to 
the fact that data is measured only every five years. 
 
1.4 Results 
1.4.1 Profitability 
Three measurements of profitability are used in this chapter: ROS, profits, and value added. 
To obtain ROS, I need to know the profit margin first, follow Alpay et al. (2002), based on the 
data I have, the manufacturing profit of each county can be calculated as:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑡 
This is a reasonable measure of the total profits, since Shipmentsit provides information 
about the total revenues, while the other three variables of the left hand side provide information 
about the total costs of labor, raw materials, and capital expenditures. Then ROS is the proportion 
of profits over total value of shipments, specifically  𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡/𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 . Another 
measurement about the manufacturing performance is value added, which could be obtained 
directly from the data. The major difference between value added and level of profit is that value 
added is production based, while profit is sales based. So value added includes not only current 
products that are sold in the markets, but also those unsold as inventories. To control price 
inflation, values of variables in the data set are divided by the manufacturing PPI deflator provided 
by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), using 2005 as the base year.  
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Moreover, Conyon and Machin (1991) argue that labor markets’ characteristics affect the 
profit margins in UK manufacturing, so the control variables also include the proportion of 
production workers over total employees of each county at each survey year. Since the labor 
characteristics variable may correlate with unobserved error terms, such as the manufacturing 
entrepreneurs’ preferences or managerial abilities, in order to identify the model, production 
worker rate is treated as an endogenous variable.  
Table 1-4 presents the estimated models using ROS, including only the current pollutant -
specific regulatory status. The first four columns are results from fixed effects (FE) models:11 
column (1) and (2) do not include the first lag of ROS, while column (3) and (4) include one lag 
of it, which are similar to robustness check in Greenstone (2002). Except CO regulatory status, the 
other three pollutant-specific regulatory statuses do not have significant impacts on ROS from 
static or “exogenous” dynamic models, although the signs of the first two columns are consistent 
with findings from Rassier and Earnhart (2010): negative impacts from static models. Columns 
(5)-(6) are results from panel dynamic models, which is different from the robustness check models 
from Greenstone (2002) by treating the lag of ROS as predetermined. Simple panel dynamic 
models return similar results to the FE estimates, no significant impacts from environmental 
regulations on the ROS, except CO regulation. The last two columns are the results from dynamic 
feedback effects models, where the regulatory status is treated as predetermined as well, since it is 
correlated with previous pollution level. The results show that the CAA regulation, especially 
regulation on CO emissions, has statistically significant and positive impacts on ROS, with or 
without inclusion of time fixed effects. The model from column (8) is optimal, comparing to 
                                              
11 King and Lanox (2001) compare FE and RE, and find that FE could be more reliable, so this chapter applies FE as 
baseline estimates. 
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negative impacts from static estimates and simple dynamic models, the dynamic feedback effects 
model shows that non-attainment status in CO regulation increases ROS by 1.74%, which is about 
a $33.48 million profit margin (2005 dollars).12 The impacts from capital intensity, market share, 
and production worker rate are reasonable across models, although from dynamic models, the 
impacts of production worker are no longer significant. This may be a result of the first lag of ROS 
capturing most of the variation from history. 
Table 1-5 presents results for profits, while Table 1-6 presents results for manufacturing 
value added. Similar results can be found, which enhance the fact that feedback effects are 
important in testing positive impacts from CAA. In Table 1-5, the static and simple dynamic 
models return significantly negative impacts from CAA regulations, especially regulations based 
on PM, Ozone, and CO. Even the GMM dynamic models suggest a negative although insignificant 
impacts on profits, except CO regulation. Allowing for feedback effects, the impacts of CO 
regulation on profits become positive and statistically significant. Based on Model 8, profits are 
increased about $28.73 million (2005 dollars); in contrast the parallel static model, Model 2, 
suggests a decrease of $67.14 million, solely from non-attainment under CO regulation. For 
manufacturing value added, the GMM dynamic feedback model implies an increase of $8.01 
million versus a $40.52 million decrease estimated from the static model for CO regulation. 
Taken together, the results from Table 1-4 to Table 1-6 suggest that estimates from simple 
dynamic models and static models are downward biased. The signs of the coefficients on pollutant -
specific regulatory statuses change dramatically from negative (insignificant) in simple dynamic 
models to positive (significant) in dynamic feedback effects models, showing that the feedback 
                                              
12 36.75 million dollars is obtained by multiplying the regulatory impacts by the average total value of shipments, 
which is 1.74%*1.9243 billion=33.48 million. 
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effects do affect the estimates significantly. Intuitively, without considering feedback effects, 
treating the profitability as predetermined leaves the effect of 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡 static. Thus it proves that 
current instantaneous effect of regulation on profitability is negative because of the increase in 
abatement costs. However, allowing feedback effects introduced by the nature of CAA regulations 
would take past regulatory effects into account. As a result, the effects on profitability turn to 
positive. Under this circumstance, it also lends some supports to the applicability of the data with 
every five-year frequency, since it takes time for both the technology and the status to change. 
Moreover, Hausman tests for the exogeneity of regulatory status reject the null, indicating that 
feedback effects exist in the data. 
1.4.2 Employment and Capital Expenditures 
Employment and capital expenditure are parts of the firms’ decision making targets; 
moreover, to have a more broad idea about the environmental regulatory effects on different 
outcomes, this chapter analyzes these two variables as well. Similar to profitability equation [1.1], 
we have the following dynamic models for employment and capital expenditures: 
[1.2]            𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ_𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜌𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ _𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜽𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝒙𝒊𝒕 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
[1.3]            𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜌𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜽𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝒙𝒊𝒕 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
Employment equation [1.2] has similar specification to the pure dynamics of employment 
without environmental regulations in Arellano and Bond (1991); control variables in xit vector 
include payroll, capital expenditures, and size and industry dummies. Xepapadeas and Zeeuw 
(1999) indicates capital expenditures equation [1.3], since regulatory status will affect the capital 
expenditure decisions made by producers about whether to spend more on abatement or on R&D 
to improve the production efficiency. Results are presented in Table 1-7. 
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As shown in Table 1-7, the naïve models return negative estimates of environmental 
regulation impacts on employment growth and capital expenditures, only CO regulation is 
significant. Since regulations cause instantaneous increase in costs, and reductions in output, job 
loss will increase as well. Different from studying the overall employment growth, Walker (2012) 
adopts establishment-level longitudinal database to analyze the distributional consequences of 
environmental regulations, and finds that jobs are reallocated among firms in close related 
industry. Although negative effect on employment is found for regulated firms, such worker 
migration process may lend support to no significant effect at the economy wide level, because 
workers could move from lower efficiency firms to higher efficiency ones. For the results on 
capital expenditures, the pattern is similar, except that GMM dynamic with feedback effect model 
returns statistically significant and positive CO regulation impacts. Although CAA does not 
significantly affect employment growth, feedback effects do exist in the data, since signs of 
coefficients that with the most interests change from negative to positive when feedback effects 
are modeled. More formally, endogeneity tests suggest that regulation measures should not be 
treated as exogenous, which enhance the findings about regulatory effects on profitability.  
 
1.5 Discussion 
Using county-level manufacturing data, results from feedback dynamic panel models 
suggest that feedback effects are critical in testing whether more stringent environmental 
regulations, at least for CAA, will help firms improve the profitability. Porter and Van der Linde 
(1995) argue that such regulations "must create the maximum opportunity for innovation, leaving 
the approach to innovation to industry and not the standard-setting agency...the regulatory process 
should leave as little room as possible for uncertainty at every stage". To correct the present-biased 
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preferences about innovations, it is better for government to leave firms free to choose technologies 
via proper guidance than to set up unique technological standard. Government may consider about 
providing proper subsidies for R&D or for adopting greener technologies, at the same time when 
providing more stringent environmental regulations. 13  In addition, patent policies about 
innovations on green technologies could act as complement to environmental regulations, and 
protect the enthusiasm of innovations in low-cost firms. Training programs for small and medium 
enterprises about the regulations and technologies could help them survive without wasting too 
many resources.14 Above all, policies that aim at encouraging and guiding profitable innovations 
will enhance the regulatory impacts of stringent environmental policies. 
Several extensions of this chapter in the future could help understand the relationship 
between environmental regulations and economic performances better, thus policy 
recommendations could be more reliable. First of all, this chapter focuses on the effects of CAA 
on manufacturing performance. Extensions about CAA effects on other industries, or other 
environmental regulations (e.g. clean water regulations) on manufacturing performance using 
similar methodologies could help to draw a more general conclusion about whether environmental 
regulations could induce win-win situation for society. Since feedback effects exist in most of the 
dynamic procedures, the methodology employed in this chapter could be applied to other dynamic 
studies. Secondly, more detailed information could help identify the underlying mechanism of 
positive impacts from CAA on manufacturing firms performance. For example, the job-flow 
                                              
13 So far, numerous states provide favorable tax treatment for the construction and installation of pollution control 
equipment. This kind of subsidy does not affect the empirical results in this chapter dramatically. Since the tax-benefit 
subsidy is taken as part of the decisions on capital expenditures. There may be innovation incentives due to subsidy, 
and such incentive effects may exceed the requirements of green technology. The feedback effects still perform 
important role in estimating the impacts. 
14 See Lyon and Van Hoof (2009) and Rochon-Fabien and Lanoies (2010). 
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patterns could be tracked more precisely with longitudinal data using feedback panel dynamic 
models. Thus it could help to understand how dynamics in employment affect profitability under 
environmental regulation. Moreover, if different investments data are available, especially the 
R&D investment data, and if feedback effects dynamic models could return significantly positive 
effects from environmental regulation, the channels through which the Porter Hypothesis works 
could be identified more clearly. In addition, more detailed data could shed light on how 
environmental regulations affect the location decisions of firms, as well as the spatial spillovers. 15 
The last but not the least, studies about the optimal degree of stringency could get rid of coming 
to the hasty conclusion about implementing more and more stringent environmental regulations. 
Since this chapter only compares regulated to unregulated without more detailed distinguis hes 
about the degrees of stringency, it might be the case that in some intervals of stringency, increasing 
stringency will increase profitability, while in some other intervals, increasing stringency 
decreases profitability even when feedback effects are considered. These are beyond the scope of 
this chapter, and could serve as future extensions under the same feedback effects framework. 
                                              
15 See Millimet and Roy (2011) about the spatial endogeneity of environmental regulations. 
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Appendix A: Tables 
Table 1-1: Related Previous Empirical Studies 
Reference Data Model Results 
Walker (2012) Panel data: about 150,000 
plants of U.S. over 10 years, 
with gaps 
Triple-difference estimators on 
wages and employment 
Controls: county,  industry, sector,  
nonattainment, year fixed effects, 
and their interactions 
Negative effects on 
wages and 
employment 
Lanoie et al. 
(2011) 
Cross-section data: mailed 
survey, 4,200 manufacturing 
facilities in 7 OECD 
countries, 2003 
IV-probit model 
Controls: technology standards, 
performance standards, country, 
sector, age, log(emp), etc 
Negative effect on 
economic 
performance 
Rassier and 
Earnhart(2010) 
Panel data: 73 U.S. chemical 
firms, 1995-2001 
Dependent variable: ROS 
Controls: capital intensity; age of 
assets; size; market share; industry 
concentration 
Negative effect on 
ROS (Return on 
Sales) 
Alpay et al. (2002) Panel data: Mexican and 
U.S. processed food sectors, 
plant-level data from 1962 to 
1994 
Regress ln(profit) on ln(prices), 
regulation, time, and their squares 
and interactions. 
U.S.: no effect  
Mexico: negative 
effect 
Greenstone (2002) Panel data: 1.75 million U.S. 
manufacturing plant 
observations over four 
census periods (1967-1987) 
Dependent variables: plant growth 
of shipments, employment, and 
capital expenditure  
Controls: plant size, age, ownership, 
wages, industry indicators 
Negative effects on 
all three dependent 
variables 
King and 
Lenox(2001) 
Panel data: 652 U.S. 
manufacturing firms over 
1987-1996. 
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q 
Controls: size, capital intensity, 
sales growth, leverage, R&D  
No effect 
Khanna and 
Damon (1999) 
Panel data: 123 U.S. 
chemical firms over 1991-
1993, participating in 33/50 
program or not 
Dependent variables: ROI, EV/S  
Controls: sales, capacity utilization, 
sales growth, age, innovativeness. 
Negative effect on 
ROI 
Positive effect on 
EV/S 
Brannlund et al. 
(1995) 
Panel data: 41 Sweden pulp 
mills for the period 1986-
1990 
Estimation of regulated and 
unregulated profit using a non-
parametric model of the technology 
for each mill 
Control: output, categories, size 
No effect on most of 
the mills 
Average: negative 
effect 
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Table 1-2:Summary Statistics of Total Value of Shipments (in $Millions) 
Year Observations Min Median 75th 
percentile 
Mean Max Std. Dev. 
1982 2,586 0.31 208.92 713.63 1,130.48 134,719 4,346.08 
1987 2,492 0.15 276.94 954.92 1,401.80 149,366.6 4,949.45 
1992 2,595 0.26 310.84 1,048.31 1,424.31 132,357.5 4,748.21 
1997 1,992 29.94 652.46 1,782.37 2,182.60 126,220.4 5,963.19 
2002 1,814 41.06 709.40 1,917.94 2,269.19 121,923.3 5,740.96 
2007 1,549 52.68 857.08 2,232.60 2,666.78 156,710.9 7,281.32 
2012 1,945 0.27 578.11 1,606.44 2,011.54 156,240.1 6,209.90 
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Table 1-3: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
Variable Observations Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Units 
Profit 12,877 0.5406 1.6744 -2.8983 45.7724 Billion dollars 
Value added 12,878 0.9075 2.7808 -0.3864 76.1208 Billion dollars 
Capital 
expenditures 
13,010 0.0622 0.2028 0.0001 6.3414 Billion dollars 
Total shipments 13,010 1.9576 5.8868 0.0003 156.7109 Billion dollars 
Total payroll 13,002 0.3075 1.0172 0.0000 34.5641 Billion dollars 
Costs of materials 12,880 1.0502 3.2795 0.0000 109.3977 Billion dollars 
Employment 
growth rate 
10,098 1.0434 2.4560 -2.2014 7.6733 Percentage 
Capital intensity 13,010 0.0307 0.0218 0.0000 0.3996 Percentage 
Market share 13,010 0.0005 0.0016 0.0000 0.0461 Percentage 
Production worker 
rate 
13,010 0.7573 0.1187 0.0000 5.7143 Percentage 
ROS 12,877 0.2595 0.1128 -0.7321 0.9762 Percentage 
Note: The full sample has 11120 observations. The number of observations reported here correspond to the estimation 
samples, which differs from 11120 due to missing values of some controls, e.g. production worker rate. 
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Table 1-4: Estimated Models for ROS 
 Static 
((1)-(2)) 
Simple Dynamic 
((3)-(4)) 
GMM Dynamic 
((5)-(6)) 
GMM Dynamic with 
Feedback Effects 
 ((7)-(8)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 - - 0.068*** 
(0.012) 
0.034*** 
(0.012) 
0.478** 
(0.190) 
-0.278 
(0.496) 
0.461*** 
(0.075) 
0.437*** 
(0.142) 
Status_PM 0.023*** 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.013 
(0.016) 
0.026 
(0.024) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
Status_ozone -0.014*** 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.019) 
-0.044 
(0.035) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
Status_CO -0.040*** 
(0.007) 
-0.024*** 
(0.007) 
-0.028*** 
(0.006) 
-0.018*** 
(0.006) 
-0.019 
(0.022) 
-0.074* 
(0.046) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
Status_SO2 -0.015 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.018 
(0.012) 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
-0.020 
(0.024) 
-0.053 
(0.036) 
-0.013 
(0.014) 
-0.018 
(0.017) 
Cap_intensity -1.285*** 
(0.048) 
-1.230*** 
(0.057) 
-1.121*** 
(0.050) 
-1.117*** 
(0.050) 
-1.179*** 
 (0.077) 
-1.129*** 
 (0.094) 
-1.166*** 
 (0.066) 
-1.208***  
(0.073) 
Market share 7.567* 
(3.944) 
6.227** 
(3.139) 
5.490*** 
(1.879) 
4.403** 
(1.860) 
3.976 
(2.593) 
3.843* 
(2.379) 
10.245** 
(4.758) 
5.037** 
(2.490) 
Production worker 
rate 
0.019 
 (0.012) 
0.025* 
 (0.014) 
0.049***  
(0.013) 
0.046***  
(0.012) 
-0.398 
(0.330) 
-1.008  
(0.671) 
0.005 
(0.077) 
-0.057 
(0.078) 
# of Obs 12,877 12,877 8,778 8,778 8,778 8,778 8,778 8,778 
# of counties 2,679 2,679 2,222 2,222 2,222 2,222 2,222 2,222 
# of instruments - - - - 27 32 93 98 
Arellano-Bond 
test  
- - - - -0.73 
 (0.467) 
-0.70 
(0.482) 
1.87 
(0.061) 
1.34 
(0.180) 
Hansen test for 
overid 
- - - - 2.44 
(0.296) 
0.56 
(0.755) 
64.87 
(0.585) 
80.89 
(0.136) 
Hausman test for 
exogeneity 
- - - - 46.26 
(0.005) 
49.19 
(0.001) 
95.38 
(0.000) 
87.09 
(0.000) 
Size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: *** represents 1% significance level, ** represents 5% significance level, and * represents 10% significance level. Standard 
errors are reported in the parentheses. For test statistics, those in the parentheses are the p -values. Column (1)-(4) are estimated 
results from static FE models with or without dynamics, and with or without time fixed effects; column  (5)-(6) are results from 
panel dynamic models using Arrellano-Bond estimates, with or without time fixed effects; similarly, the last two columns reports 
the dynamic feedback effects models, with or without time fixed effects. Hausman tests for endogeneit y of 𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 in column (5) 
and (6) significantly reject the null of exogeneity, confirming that 𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 is indeed endogenous. Hausman tests for endogeneity 
of both 𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 𝑖𝑡  in column (7) and (8) also significantly reject the null, confirming that feedback effects do exist, and 
will affect the estimates.  
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Table 1-5: Estimated Models for Profits 
 Static 
((1)-(2)) 
Simple Dynamic 
((3)-(4)) 
GMM Dynamic 
((5)-(6)) 
GMM Dynamic with 
Feedback Effects 
 ((7)-(8)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 - - 0.170*** 
(0.009) 
0.167*** 
(0.009) 
-0.409* 
(0.221) 
-0.409** 
(0.206) 
0.125* 
(0.074) 
0.086 
(0.073) 
Status_PM 0.230*** 
(0.066) 
0.200*** 
(0.071) 
0.047 
(0.030) 
0.044 
(0.031) 
0.659 
(0.417) 
0.433 
(0.340) 
0.112 
(0.089) 
0.060 
(0.077) 
Status_ozone -0.195*** 
(0.046) 
-0.162*** 
(0.048) 
-0.150*** 
(0.028) 
-0.146*** 
(0.027) 
-0.734 
(0.448) 
-0.758 
(0.0476) 
0.051 
(0.068) 
0.026 
(0.066) 
Status_CO -0.634*** 
(0.082) 
-0.604*** 
(0.106) 
-0.316*** 
(0.038) 
-0.316*** 
(0.038) 
-1.326** 
(0.558) 
-1.229** 
(0.548) 
0.243** 
(0.118) 
0.250** 
(0.120) 
Status_SO2 -0.269** 
(0.122) 
-0.229 
(0.144) 
-0.242*** 
(0.072) 
-0.240*** 
(0.071) 
-0.778* 
(0.486) 
-0.770 
(0.472) 
-0.061 
(0.187) 
-0.060 
(0.193) 
Cap_intensity -1.642*** 
(0.221) 
-1.724*** 
(0.217) 
-1.247*** 
(0.310) 
-1.662*** 
(0.313) 
-0.975 
 (0.2818) 
-1.975** 
 (0.817) 
-1.275*** 
 (0.214) 
-1.415***  
(0.257) 
Market share 939.158*** 
(168.648) 
932.511*** 
(160.694) 
1,000.192*** 
(12.350) 
996.874*** 
(12.294) 
1,457.673*** 
(135.955) 
1,455.99*** 
(134.859) 
1,049.98*** 
(80.025) 
1,063.067*** 
(93.753) 
Production 
worker rate 
0.247*** 
 (0.094) 
0.206** 
 (0.084) 
0.404***  
(0.078) 
0.331***  
(0.078) 
-7.588 
(9.108) 
-5.90 
(7.149) 
1.579** 
(0.657) 
1.152 
(0.847) 
# of Obs 12,877 12,877 8,778 8,778 8,778 8,778 8,778 8,778 
# of counties 2,679 2,679 2,222 2,222 2,222 2,222 2,222 2,222 
# of 
instruments 
- - - - 27 32 93 98 
Arellano-
Bond test  
- - - - 0.19 
 (0.848) 
0.71 
(0.475) 
1.33 
(0.184) 
1.27 
(0.204) 
Hansen test 
for overid 
- - - - 8.77 
(0.362) 
4.83 
(0.090) 
48.56 
(0.491) 
45.47 
(0.617) 
Hausman test 
for 
exogeneity 
- - - - 35.92 
(0.004) 
40.45 
(0.004) 
111.03 
(0.000) 
71.66 
(0.000) 
Size 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: *** represents 1% significance level, ** represents 5% significance level, and * represents 10% significance level. Standard 
errors are reported in the parentheses. For test statistics, those in the parentheses are the p -values. Column (1)-(4) are estimated 
results from static FE models with or without dynamics, and with or without time fixed effects; column (5) -(6) are results from 
panel dynamic models using Arrellano-Bond estimates, with or without time fixed effects; similarly, the last two columns reports 
the dynamic feedback effects models, with or without time fixed effects. Hausman tests return similar results as in Table 1-4, 
supporting that the regulatory status is indeed endogenous. 
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Table 1-6: Estimated Models for Manufacturing Value Added 
 Static 
((1)-(2)) 
Simple Dynamic 
((3)-(4)) 
GMM Dynamic 
((5)-(6)) 
GMM Dynamic with 
Feedback Effects 
 ((7)-(8)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡 −1 - - 0.087*** 
(0.008) 
0.084*** 
(0.008) 
-1.884* 
(1.128) 
-0.702 
(0.891) 
0.191** 
(0.077) 
0.154** 
(0.076) 
Status_PM 0.097 
(0.078) 
0.093 
(0.070) 
-0.079** 
(0.032) 
-0.056* 
(0.032) 
3.615 
(2.721) 
0.616 
(1.526) 
-0.005 
(0.078) 
-0.016 
(0.078) 
Status_ozone -0.183*** 
(0.040) 
-0.138*** 
(0.044) 
-0.117*** 
(0.027) 
-0.117*** 
(0.028) 
-3.490 
(3.025) 
-1.244 
(2.691) 
0.118 
(0.089) 
-0.045 
(0.066) 
Status_CO -0.261** 
(0.123) 
-0.248** 
(0.125) 
0.044 
(0.039) 
0.023 
(0.040) 
-4.390 
(3.595) 
-1.587 
(3.128) 
0.217* 
(0.130) 
0.047* 
(0.028) 
Status_SO2 -0.250* 
(0.139) 
-0.209* 
(0.120) 
-0.165** 
(0.073) 
-0.171** 
(0.072) 
-1.341 
(1.753) 
-0.759 
(1.314) 
-0.064 
(0.150) 
-0.112 
(0.131) 
Cap_intensity 0.071 
(0.163) 
-0.134 
(0.214) 
0.859*** 
(0.317) 
0.220 
(0.319) 
3.935 
 (5.821) 
-2.049 
 (5.647) 
0.542** 
 (0.237) 
0.110  
(0.217) 
Market share 1,369.588*** 
(167.253) 
1,362.826*** 
(176.898) 
1,463.75*** 
(13.954) 
1,461.37*** 
(13.846) 
2,943.42*** 
(853.755) 
2,166.94*** 
(686.705) 
1,500.46*** 
(169.531) 
1,508.99*** 
(168.72) 
Production 
worker rate 
0.058 
 (0.048) 
-0.040 
 (0.053) 
0.095  
(0.073) 
0.006  
(0.073) 
-132.222 
(97.918) 
-24.669 
(63.699) 
1.817** 
(0.897) 
0.269 
(0.664) 
# of Obs 12,878 12,878 9,620 9,620 9,620 9,620 9,620 9,620 
# of counties 2,679 2,679 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 
# of 
instruments 
- - - - 27 32 93 98 
Arellano-Bond 
test  
- - - - -1.36 
 (0.173) 
-0.33 
(0.739) 
1.09 
(0.275) 
0.99 
(0.324) 
Hansen test for 
overid 
- - - - 0.65 
(0.721) 
11.16 
(0.193) 
58.63 
(0.163) 
55.27 
(0.250) 
Hausman test 
for exogeneity 
- - - - 69.85 
(0.0000) 
3.03 
(0.220) 
91.36 
(0.0000) 
61.83 
(0.0000) 
Size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
T ime dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: *** represents 1% significance level, ** represents 5% significance level,  and * represents 10% significance level. Standard 
errors are reported in the parentheses. For test statistics, those in the parentheses are the p -values. Column (1)-(4) are estimated 
results from static FE models with or without dynamics, and with or without time fixed effects; column (5)-(6) are results from 
panel dynamic models using Arrellano-Bond estimates, with or without time fixed effects; similarly, the last two columns reports 
the dynamic feedback effects models, with or without time fixed effects.  Hausman tests are similar to previous tables. 
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Table 1-7: Pollutant-specific Regulatory Effects on Employment Growth and Capital 
Expenditure 
 Static 
((1)-(2)) 
Simple Dynamic 
((3)-(4)) 
GMM Dynamic 
((5)-(6)) 
GMM Dynamic with 
Feedback Effects 
 ((7)-(8)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 A. Employment Growth 
Status_PM -0.598*** 
(0.094) 
-0.018 
(0.013) 
-0.513*** 
(0.127) 
-0.009 
(0.016) 
-0.699 
(6.57) 
-0.037 
(0.077) 
1.862*** 
(0.475) 
-0.061*** 
(0.019) 
Status_ozone -0.092 
(0.082) 
0.007 
(0.012) 
-0.094 
(0.125) 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
-7.800** 
(3.653) 
-0.060 
(0.087) 
-1.705*** 
(0.622) 
-0.033 
(0.024) 
Status_CO -0.424*** 
(0.133) 
-0.025 
(0.016) 
-0.375** 
(0.169) 
-0.036* 
(0.021) 
-2.002 
(3.976) 
-0.189 
(0.133) 
1.830** 
(0.743) 
0.083*** 
(0.028) 
Status_SO2 0.194 
(0.241) 
0.003 
(0.021) 
-0.307 
(0.326) 
0.015 
(0.040) 
-6.938** 
(3.121) 
-0.003 
(0.064) 
-0.341 
(1.608) 
0.044 
(0.041) 
 B. Capital Expenditure 
Status_PM 0.004 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.012 
(0.035) 
0.025 
(0.037) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
Status_ozone -0.017** 
(0.007) 
-0.015* 
(0.009) 
-0.025*** 
(0.005) 
-0.025*** 
(0.005) 
-0.080* 
(0.031) 
-0.051** 
(0.024) 
0.028** 
(0.012) 
0.017* 
(0.011) 
Status_CO -0.027 
(0.017) 
-0.024* 
(0.013) 
-0.044*** 
(0.007) 
-0.039*** 
(0.007) 
0.095 
(0.094) 
0.096 
(0.1112) 
0.052*** 
(0.020) 
0.041** 
(0.018) 
Status_SO2 -0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.000 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.031 
(0.039) 
-0.041 
(0.038) 
-0.002 
(0.035) 
-0.004 
(0.033) 
Size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: *** represents 1% significance level, ** represents 5% significance level, and * represents 10% significance level. 
Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Column (1)-(4) are estimated using FE, in which (1) and (2) are static models 
without one lag of dependent variables, while (3) and (4) are simple dynamic models by including one lag of the dependent 
variables. 
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Appendix B: Key Variable Definitions 16 
Total Value of Shipments (Billion 2005 Dollars) Includes the received or receivable net selling 
values, "Free on Board (FOB) plant (exclusive of freight and taxes), of all products shipped, both 
primary and secondary, as well as all miscellaneous receipts, such as receipts for contract work 
performed for others, installation and repair, sales of scrap, and sales of products bought and sold 
without further processing. Included are all items made by or for the establishments from material 
owned by it, whether sold, transferred to other plants of the same company, or shipped on 
consignment. The net selling value of products made in one plant on a contract basis from materials 
owned by another was reported by the plant providing the materials. 
Employment (in 1000) This item includes all full-time and part-time employees on the payrolls 
of operating manufacturing establishments during any part of the pay period which included the 
12th of the months specified on the report form. Included are all persons on paid sick leave, paid 
holidays, and paid vacations during these pay periods. Officers of corporations are included as 
employees; proprietors and partners of unincorporated firms are excluded. The "all employees" 
number is the average number of production workers plus the number of other employees in mid-
March. The number of production workers is the average for the payroll periods including the 12th 
of March, May, August, and November. 
Production Workers (in 1000) Included in this item are workers (up through the line-supervisor level) 
engaged in fabricating, processing, assembling, inspecting, receiving, storing, handling, packing, 
warehousing, shipping (but not delivering), maintenance, repair, janitorial and guard services, product 
development, auxiliary production for plant's own use (e.g., power plant), recordkeeping, and other services 
                                              
16 Definitions are from Economic Census. 
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closely associated with these production operations at the establishment covered by the report. Employees 
above the working-supervisor level are excluded. 
Payroll (Billion 2005 Dollars) This item includes the gross earnings of all employees on the 
payrolls of operating manufacturing establishments paid in the calendar year 1992. Respondents 
were told they could follow the definition of payrolls used for calculating the Federal withholding 
tax. It includes all forms of compensation, such as salaries, wages, commissions, dismissal pay, 
bonuses, vacation and sick leave pay, and compensation in kind, prior to such deductions as 
employees' Social Security contributions, withholding taxes, group insurance, union dues, and 
savings bonds. The total includes salaries of officers of corporations; it excludes payments to 
proprietors or partners of unincorporated concerns. Also excluded are payments to members of 
Armed Forces and pensioners carried on the active payrolls of manufacturing establishments. 
Cost of Materials (Billion 2005 Dollars) This term refers to direct charges actually paid or 
payable for items consumed or put into production during the year, including freight charges and 
other direct charges incurred by the establishment in acquiring these materials. It includes the cost 
of materials or fuel consumed, whether purchased by the individual establishment from other 
companies, transferred to it from other establishments of the same company, or withdrawn from 
inventory during the year. 
Value Added by Manufacture (Billion 2005 Dollars) This measure of manufacturing activity is 
derived by subtracting the cost of materials, supplies, containers, fuel, purchased electricity, and 
contract work from the value of shipments (products manufactured plus receipts for services 
rendered). The result of this calculation is adjusted by the addition of value added by 
merchandising operations (i.e., the difference between the sales value and the cost of merchandise 
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sold without further manufacture, processing, or assembly) plus the net change in finished goods 
and work-in-process between the beginning- and end-of-year inventories. 
New and Used Capital Expenditures (Billion 2005 Dollars) For establishments in operation and 
any known plants under construction, manufacturers were asked to report their new expenditures 
for (1) permanent additions and major alterations to manufacturing establishments, and (2) 
machinery and equipment used for replacement and additions to plant capacity if they were of the 
type for which depreciation accounts were ordinarily maintained.  
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Appendix C: Entry-exit Effect 
Firms’ entry-exit effects will not change the results dramatically. First of all, the size 
dummies and industry dummies could capture such effects in some degrees. Secondly, the number 
of establishments (total or whose employees are more than 20) does not change dramatically in 
the data as shown in Table 1-8: 
 
Table 1-8: Summary Statistics of Establishments 
Variable Description Total Counties Attainment 
Counties 
Non-
attainment 
Counties 
  Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
ESTAB_growth Growth rate of the total 
number of establishments  
-0.008 0.237 0.005 0.157 -0.011 0.249 
EST20E_growth Growth rate of the number of 
establishments who have more 
than 20 employees 
-0.024 0.284 -0.029 0.225 -0.023 0.295 
P_estab Proportion of establishments 
having more than 20 
employees over total number 
of establishments 
0.329 0.130 0.325 0.095 0.330 0.136 
 Note: For each county, there are relatively large establishments with more than 20 employees, which are supposed to 
behave differently from relatively smaller ones. Results show that the numbers of both types of establishments in 
attainment counties or non-attainment counties do not change dramatically. The underlying dynamic changes of 
establishments need more detailed data.  
 
Last but not the least, Table 1-9 provides some robustness checks by using average on 
profitability, showing that using average measurements does not change the general patterns of 
different estimates. The conclusions in this chapter still hold. Note that the average measurements 
may be problematic because of different types of firms in a certain county will be treated as the 
same. That is part of the reason why there are no impacts of regulatory statuses on average profits 
and value added. However, without distinguishing big firms from small ones by treating them as 
different departments of a huge company, “the manufacturing sector company”, the use of total 
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county-level measurements will be more accurate as proxies to firm performances. And the 
estimates of the coefficient on regulatory status could be interpreted as the average total effects on 
all the manufacturing firms. With more detailed data, different effects on big firms and small firms 
will be captured more precisely, and could be extended in the future analysis.  
 
Table 1-9: Estimated Models Based on Average Measurements of Profitability 
 Static  
((1)-(2)) 
Simple Dynamic 
((3)-(4)) 
Panel Dynamic 
((5)-(6)) 
Dynamic Feedback Effects 
 ((7)-(8)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 A. Average ROS 
Status_PM 0.0232*** 
(0.0050) 
0.0080 
(0.0053) 
0.0094* 
(0.0055) 
0.0039 
(0.0057) 
-0.0355 
(0.0258) 
0.0037 
(0.0273) 
0.0078 
(0.0087) 
0.0111 
(0.0086) 
Status_ozone -0.0118*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0003 
(0.0031) 
-0.0082* 
(0.0047) 
-0.0057 
(0.0046) 
-0.0010 
(0.0328) 
0.0296 
(0.0254) 
-0.0092 
(0.0094) 
0.0042 
(0.0090) 
Status_CO -0.0345*** 
(0.0055) 
-0.0201*** 
(0.0046) 
-0.0296*** 
(0.0061) 
-0.0198*** 
(0.0061) 
-0.0367* 
(0.0195) 
-0.0136 
(0.0159) 
0.0255*** 
(0.0081) 
0.0201** 
(0.0081) 
Status_SO2 -0.0188** 
(0.0085) 
-0.0042 
(0.0085) 
-0.0158 
(0.0120) 
-0.0094 
(0.0118) 
-0.0311 
(0.0291) 
-0.0322 
(0.0283) 
-0.0142 
(0.0138) 
-0.0091 
(0.0152) 
 B. Average Profits 
Status_PM 0.0005 
(0.0004) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-0.0000 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004 
(0.0010) 
-0.0011 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004 
(0.0002) 
Status_ozone -0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0005 
(0.0006) 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-0.0009** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0008 
(0.0015) 
0.0002 
(0.0009) 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
Status_CO -0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0013*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0004 
(0.0006) 
0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
Status_SO2 -0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0021) 
0.0001 
(0.0004) 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0006 
(0.0004) 
-0.0007 
(0.0021) 
-0.0004 
(0.0010) 
-0.0003 
(0.0004) 
 C. Average Value Added 
Status_PM 0.0005*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0016 
(0.0008) 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
Status_ozone -0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0010** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0003 
(0.0010) 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
Status_CO -0.0005** 
(0.00002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003* 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0001 
(0.0014) 
0.0001* 
(0.0000) 
0.0003* 
(0.0002) 
Status_SO2 -0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0004 
(0.0004) 
-0.0000 
(0.0004) 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0008 
(0.0005) 
-0.0005 
(0.0011) 
-0.0007 
(0.0005) 
-0.0007 
(0.0007) 
Size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
T ime dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Note: Estimated models are similar to those using total measurements, and * represents 10% significance level. 
Though some noises are present in FE and simple dynamic models, which may due to different behaviors of big 
establishments and small establishments since size is discussed as an important control variable in previous literature, 
the results present a similar pattern to the main results from Table 1-4 to Table 1-7: the dynamic feedback effects 
models return significantly positive regulatory impacts. 
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Appendix D: Selection of Instruments  
In order to find proper instruments for dynamic panel model, one can either use the lagged 
level predetermined variables based on first-difference equation, or the lagged first-difference 
predetermined variables based on level equation. Based on the estimated model, the level equation 
is: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜌𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜽𝒛𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝒙𝒊𝒕 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 , (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇) 
And differenced equation is: 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜽∆𝒛𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷∆𝒙𝑖𝑡 + Δ𝛾𝑡 + Δ𝑣𝑖𝑡 , (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 3, … , 𝑇) 
T=6. Considering the level equation, there are 4 GMM-type instruments based on 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1:  
E(Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1𝑣𝑖𝑡) = 0  for   𝑡 = 3, 4, … ,6. 
Since an intercept is included, there is an additional instrument included: E(𝑣𝑖𝑡) = 0. Considering 
the first-differenced equation, there are 10 GMM-type instruments based on  𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 :  
E(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑠Δ𝑣𝑖𝑡) = 0  for   𝑡 =  3, … ,6  and 𝑠 = 2, … , 𝑡 − 1, 
In addition, 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  in 𝒙𝒊𝒕  is predetermined and needs to be instrumented. Similar to 
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, there are 19 instruments available: 
E(Δ𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡𝑣𝑖𝑡) = 0  for   𝑡 = 2, 4, … ,6. 
E(𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑠Δ𝑣𝑖𝑡) = 0  for   𝑡 =  3, … ,6  and 𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑡 − 1, 
Finally, there are 26 standard instruments from the equation’s assumed exogenous 
variables (considering the GMM dynamic without feedback effects, all four regulation indicators 
are exogenous, there are another 3 size indicators, 13 industry indicators, 5 year indicators, and 
capital intensity and market share). Overall, there are 61 instruments available when estimating 
the GMM dynamic model with time effects. However, including them all does not pass the 
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autocorrelation test nor the over-identification test, indicating that some of the instruments, 
especially the GMM-type instruments are not valid. So this chapter applies further lags of the 
predetermined variables to obtain the GMM-type instruments. For both 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  and𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, 
the GMM-type instruments start with the fourth lag, which will make a 5-instrument set for each 
of them. Thus for GMM dynamic without feedback effects but with time effects, there are 32 
instruments in total; if no time effects, then 27 instruments in total. And in this case, the models 
pass all the specification tests. Considering GMM dynamic model with feedback effects where all 
the regulation indicators are predetermined as well, GMM-type instruments starting with the first 
lag are included. Thus there are 66 more instruments, making Model 7 have 93 instruments, and 
Model 8 have 98 instruments in total. 
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Chapter 2: New Evidence on the Impact of Environmental Regulation on 
Firm Mergers 
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Abstract: 
This chapter estimates the impact of environmental regulation on firm merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activity in regulated and unregulated industries. Using a comprehensive firm-
level panel dataset on U.S. manufacturing firms and a variety of estimation frameworks, this 
chapter provides new evidence suggesting that stringency of environmental regulation motivates 
mergers among regulated firms. Using two measures of environmental regulations, pollution 
abatement costs and expenditures (PACE) and exogenous variation in Clean Air Act (CAA) 
regulations, we find that increases in regulation are associated with increased probability of being 
acquired or acquiring a firm. A $10 million increase in industry abatement expenditure will have 
positive impact of around 0.7%, on the probability of being an acquirer and 0.2% on being a target 
of M&A activity. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Traditional empirical and theoretical analyses focused on the effects of environmental 
regulations suggest that firms can optimally respond to more stringent regulations by undertaking 
internal actions such as abatement efforts and technology adoption. However, especially for 
significant regulatory changes, the optimization can give rise to strategic responses across firms. 17 
One potentially important inter-firm strategic behavior is mergers and acquisitions (M&As, 
hereafter), which occur frequently during the last 100 years and has been referred to as a “least-
cost means” of responding to industrial shocks (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). The focus of this 
                                              
17  One example is the debate on whether environmental regulations have positive or negative impacts on firms’ 
profitability, or competitiveness, which is discussed in Chapter 1.  
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chapter is to empirically identify how industrial shocks, especially shocks due to environmental 
regulations, affect firm M&As. 
There appears to be a consensus among theoretical studies that more stringent 
environmental regulations will induce more M&As. A number of theoretical articles in 
environmental economics study the relationship between mergers and environmental regulations 
such as pollution permit, pollution taxation, etc., by bringing pollution into traditional Cournot 
oligopoly competition models (Benchekroun and Chaudhuri, 2007; Enrnart, Hoope, and Löschel, 
2008; Hennessy and Roosen, 1999; Roy Chowdhury, 2006; Lambertini and Tampieri, 2012). They 
find that under environmental regulations, firms have incentives to merge, one of the important 
incentives is profitability, and mergers are in general more profitable.18 Viscusi, Harrington, and 
Vernon (2005) highlight four incentives to merge: (1) to obtain monopoly power; (2) to produce 
pecuniary economies, e.g. monetary saving on production costs19; (3) to have real economies, e.g. 
real resource saving to generate scale of economies; (4) and to reduce management inefficiencies. 
The theoretical impacts of mergers on pollution abated is either positive (Enrnart, Hoope, and 
Löschel, 2008) or ambiguous (Hennessy and Roosen, 1999). 
Turning to empirics, the majority of the work on M&As appears in the finance literature, 
and does not focus on environmental regulations (Bergman, Jakobsson, and Razo, 2005; Gorton, 
Kahl, and Rosen, 2005; Harford, 2005; Stewart, Harris, Carleton, 1984). Many of these studies 
endeavor to identify factors that can affect decisions on M&As, such as firm size, stock market 
return, cash flow, etc., controlling for deregulation-induced merger waves (see Harford, 2005, and 
                                              
18 This applies to most of the industries except eco-industry, which is an industry attempting to reduce waste and 
pollution. Canton, David, and Sinclair-Desgagné (2007) and Canton, Soubeyran, and Stahn (2008) find that 
environmental regulations have negative impacts on mergers and acquisitions in eco-industry.  
19 Enrnart, Hoope, and Löschel (2008) find that after mergers and acquisitions, firms tend to purchase less pollution 
permits; 
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Viscusi, Harrington, and Vernon, 2005). The regulations studied include price controls and entry 
barriers stemming from antitrust regulations, which are typically analyzed in the context of specific 
industries.20 With few exceptions, empirical analyses have not considered possible interactions 
between environmental regulations and merger behavior. For instance, Cook and Chapple (2000) 
find that the Environmental Protection Act in UK did increase the probability of a waste disposal 
firm to merge.  One concern about this and other studies focused on environmental regulation 
(Berchicci, Dowell, and King, 2012) are that, unlike the broader literature, important financial 
control variables are absent thus giving rise to possible misspecification and incorrect inferences.  
Through integrating insight from both the environmental economics and finance 
literatures, this chapter presents new evidence about the relationship between environmental 
regulations and firms M&As, focusing on the impact of Clean Air Act (CAA) on manufacturing 
firms. CAA provides rich variation of regulatory stringency by annually designating county whose 
pollution level exceeds the national ambient air quality standards as non-attainment county, and 
emitters in such county will be subject to more stringent regulation than those in attainment county. 
In order to measure CAA regulatory stringency, we adopt a measure generally used in literature: 
pollution abatement cost and expenditures (PACE); furthermore, we introduce a new measure by 
taking advantages of emissions and CAA pollution redefinitions. Though it might be problematic 
to use abatement cost to proxy environmental regulatory stringency, since such cost are correlated 
with firms’ productivity and efficiency, Brunel and Levinson (2013) suggest that overall the 
abatement cost is sufficient for distinguishing the difference of environmental regulatory 
stringencies across industries. Redefinitions of regulations are based on the fact that CAA revised 
                                              
20 For example, starting from 1978, price controls on natural gas have been gradually removed until 1989. 
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the standards for pollutants over time, e.g. for Ozone, there are 1979 standard, 1997 standard, and 
2008 standard. Each change of standard leads to the number of counties being regulated changes. 
If the number increases dramatically after standard redefinition, we can conclude that CAA 
regulation of such standard is overall more stringent. 
We construct a comprehensive data set that capture both environmental and financial 
behaviors from a variety of data sources. In particular, we construct panel data of U.S. 
manufacturing firms from COMPUSTAT/CRSP that includes all the financial characteristics. 
Mergers and acquisition information can be obtained from Securities Data Corporation (SDC), 
which contains the date of announcement of a merger, and when the merger completed. Detailed 
target and acquirer information (name, SIC, company id, etc.) are available for each transaction. 
Pollution abatement cost and expenditures, one of the measures of CAA regulatory stringency can 
be found from Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s PACE surveys, which covers years from 
1979 to 1994 annually. The information of the other measure of environmental regulatory 
stringency, redefinitions of regulations, can be found from EPA’s Greenbook database.21 In order 
to track emitters and non-emitters for industries, we aggregate facility-level emission data from 
National Emissions Inventories (NEI) to be industry-level, and following similar procedure of 
Greenstone (2002) to classify emitters and non-emitters. Since NEI covers years 1990, 1996-2002, 
2005, 2008, 2011, which is more recent than PACE data but no intersection, thus at the end, we 
have two analysis samples based on two different measures of regulatory stringency: PACE (1979-
1994) and redefinitions (1990-2011, with gaps). By taking advantage of emissions and 
                                              
21 EPA Greenbook provides county-level attainment/nonattainment designations starts from 1978 annually. Due to the 
structure of our data set, which is firm-level, we do not use attainment/nonattainment designation for counties as a 
measurement of regulatory stringency directly. The use of redefinitions enable us to adopt diff-in-diff analyses. 
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redefinitions information, we create a new measure via principal component analysis. We then 
adopt logit, Poisson, as well as diff-in-diff analyses. 
Results in this chapter provide new evidence on the impact of environmental regulation on 
manufacturing firm M&A activities, suggesting that more stringent environmental regulation 
(CAA) will motive manufacturing firms conduct more M&As, and market value of M&A firms 
will increase. Logit models using PACE as measure of environmental regulations indicate that the 
marginal impact of CAA regulatory stringency on being acquirer is 0.7%, which means that at the 
mean of PACE, one-unit (10 million 1995 dollars in pollution abatement costs) increase in 
regulatory stringency will increase the probability of being an acquirer by 0.7%. Such marginal 
impacts are 0.2% and 0.3% on being target and being either acquirer or target. As for the M&As 
frequency, using both PACE and redefinitions as measures of environmental regulations return 
positive and significant results on target counts, such marginal impact using PACE is 29%, and 
about 6.0% using redefinitions. 
 
2.2 Literature review 
M&As have been studied for more than 40 years because of their distinct frequency and 
volume. Most of the M&As research is published in finance literature, only recently, 
environmental economics researchers become more interested in how environmental regulations 
would affect M&As activity, e.g. Hennessy and Roosen (1999), and Lambertini and Tampieri 
(2012) provide theoretical support that environmental regulations will motivate more M&As, but 
lack of reliable empirical studies, especially on U.S. manufacturing sector. 
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2.2.1. General M&As researches in finance 
There is limited theoretical research on M&As in the finance literature. Despite general 
discussion on motives of M&As from Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington (2005), the existing 
theories are to explain why mergers occur in waves, clustering of mergers, based on the 
observation of merger waves started from 1893. The neoclassical one argues that merger waves 
occur because firms react to economic disturbances (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001, 2002); the 
behavioral one suggests that stock valuations cause overvalued firms purchase undervalued firms 
(Sheleifer and Vishny, 2003). Related empirical studies provide evidence for both theories, e.g. 
Harford (2005) supports neoclassical explanation, while Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and 
Viswanathan (2005) provide evidence consistent with behavioral theory. Besides, the remaining 
majority of empirical M&As research in finance literature looks more closely at firms M&As from 
two aspects in general: the effects of M&As on stock prices and shareholders’ wealth and the 
determinants of conducting M&As (Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 2013).  
The wealth effect of M&As on shareholders is of primary interests for finance scholars. 
Profusion of event study on value creation provide mixed results on shareholder wealth, stock 
prices of acquirer and target. For example, Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) analyzes stock 
market response to M&As of publicly traded U.S. firms during 1973-1998 period, and finds that 
acquirers achieve negative to zero abnormal returns. However, Alexandridis, Petmezas and 
Travlos (2010) shows that acquirers do realize gains. As for the combined entity (acquirer and 
target), Mulherin and Boone (2000), Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer and Noah (2005) suggest positive 
abnormal returns, while Alexandridis, Mavrovitis and Travlos (2012) does not find superior 
combined gains. Some of the empirical studies also explore long-run returns of M&As. They either 
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find negative abnormal returns of acquirer over three years following an acquisition (Loderer and 
Martin, 1992), or no significant underperformance (Franks, Harris and Titman, 1991).  
In order to understand and explain why there is no consensus finding on wealth effect of 
M&As, and since several firm characteristics affect acquisition returns, researchers spend lots of 
efforts to identify factors lead firms to conduct M&As. Commonly accepted firm characteristics 
that will potentially affect M&As probability in the literature are firm size (Gorton, Kahl and 
Rosen, 2009; Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004), stock market return, market-to-book ratio, 
equity-to-asset ratio (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998), cash flow (Harford, 1999), asset growth rate, 
profitability, R&D intensity (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Spiegel and Tookes, 2013), leverage, 
and productivity (Harford, 2005; Siegel and Simons, 2010), which covers most of the determinants 
of domestic M&As discussed in Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2013).22  
2.2.2. Deregulatory impacts on M&As 
Besides the characteristics of M&As participants, policies like anti-trust deregulations will 
affect M&As activity as well. Intuitively, investors take anticipated regulatory intervention into 
account when considering a business combination (Aktas, Bodt and Roll, 2004), more specifically, 
deregulatory events will ease the monitoring pressure of M&A transactions, which motivates more 
M&As indirectly. Empirically, Harford (2005) shows that deregulatory event has significant ly 
positive coefficient in predicting merger waves. The positive relationship between deregulation 
and M&As is also true for cross-border M&As, e.g. Boudier and Lochard (2013) finds that the 
                                              
22 Due to measurement and sample differences, and inclusion of control variables, these paper find slightly different 
results. For example, the effect of firm size on the probability of being target is negative in Moeller, Schlingemann 
and Stulz (2004), however, Gorton, Kahl and Rosen (2009) suggests that larger target will be more attractive. In this 
paper, we include as many potential determinants as possible. If considering cross-border acquisitions, there are some 
more county-related factors that may affect M&As probability such as FDI, GDP growth, investor protection, trading 
volume, etc. (Brar, Giamouridis, and Liodakis, 2009; Breinlich, 2008; Rossi and Volpin, 2004). 
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impact of service deregulation in the target country on M&As is positive and large. Harford (2005) 
and Viscusi, Vernon and Harrington (2005) construct tables of major deregulatory events and 
corresponding industries affected. However, very few of the researches take economic regulations 
into consideration. 
2.2.3. Environmental regulation impacts on M&As 
Apart from economic regulations, environmental regulations are more often neglected in 
previous finance researches. However, from environmental economics perspective, environmental 
regulations are found to affect firm behaviors and performances significantly, most of which 
focuses on analyzing: (1) how environmental regulations affect firms’ abatement and location 
decision, e.g. Holladay (2010); (2) the relationship between environmental regulatory stringency 
and firms’ competitiveness, Jaffe, Peterson, Portney and Stavins (1995) and Shadbegian and 
Wolverton (2010) provide surveys of related literature.23  
A recently developed topic is about environmental regulatory impacts on M&A decisions, 
and several theoretical studies suggest that tighter environmental policy increases the incentives 
to merger, especially in polluting firms. Hennessy and Roosen (1999) adopts stochastic polluting 
setting to study the effects of uncertainty on emissions trading, and finds that permit management 
incentives may motivate merger, and merger is likely to increase production. Cournot models with 
pollution suggest similar results. Ehrnart, Hoppe and Loschel (2008) studies the tacit collusion 
induced by European Union emissions trading law, proposing that higher allowance price will 
induce higher firm profits, and “pooling” could trigger monopolization. Canton, David and 
Sinclair-Desgagne (2007) and Canton, Soubeyran and Stahn (2008) focus on pollution tax impacts 
                                              
23 Though there are different kinds of environmental regulations and industries, most of the empirical studies focus on 
Clean Air Act (CAA) impacts on manufacturing. Additionally, Brunel and Levinson (2013) provides comprehensive 
literature review on measurement of environmental regulatory stringency. 
51  
 
 
on M&As, and find positive impacts in polluting firm M&As but negative impacts in eco-industry, 
industry providing abatement techniques. Because more stringent environmental regulations lead 
more firms to abate pollution, providing higher demand in eco-industry, thus firms are less likely 
to cooperate with each other. Benchekroun and Chaudhuri (2007) suggests that mergers are 
generally more profitable under higher emission tax. Furthermore, Lambertini and Tampieri 
(2012) argues that the higher the negative externality from pollution, the more likely that the 
horizontal mergers could be socially efficient. 
Comparing to the development in theoretical studies on this topic, empirical analyses are 
far away from adequate. Cook and Chapple (2000), the only empirical paper explicitly does 
research on this topic, though find that the Environmental Protection Act in UK did increase the 
probability of a waste disposal firm to merge, neglect potentially important financial control 
variables as mentioned above. Berchicci, Dowell, and King (2012) implicitly considers the impacts 
of environmental regulation on M&As when studying how environmental capabilities affect 
M&As, suggesting significantly positive impacts yet without controlling financial variables like 
market-to-book ratio, stock market return, etc. By combining findings in both finance and 
environmental economics literature, our biggest contribution of this chapter is to provide relatively 
comprehensive and reliable empirical evidence on whether more stringent environmental 
regulation will motivate more M&As.  
 
2.3. Data and methodology 
2.3.1.  Data 
We merge two databases, SDC platinum from Thomson Reuters and COMPUSTAT/CRSP 
by Wharton Research Data Services, to build a firm-level panel of M&A transactions and financial 
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performance characteristics for publicly-traded firms in the U.S. manufacturing sector.24 SDC 
platinum reports mergers and acquisitions announcement date, effective date, acquirer and target 
identification and their primary industry, deal status, etc. Though SDC Platinum provides some 
financial data for acquirer and target firms, they are incomplete in both data observations and data 
variables, e.g. common shares outstanding, comparing to COMPUSTAT/CRSP data set. Thus, we 
collect additional financial characteristics that could affect M&A decisions from 
COMPUSTAT/CRSP. To merge SDC Platinum data with COMPUSTAT/CRSP, we use historical 
CUSIP, the universally recognized identifier for financial instruments. Table 2-10 in Appendix B 
provides descriptions of the financial data used in our study.  
When assess the relationship between M&A activities and environmental regulations, the 
key variable of interests is environmental regulatory stringency. We firstly adopt the traditional 
measure of environmental regulatory stringency, the Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures 
(PACE). PACE from United States Census Bureau provides statistics on abatement costs at 4-digit 
SIC industry level (manufacturing sector only) from 1978 to 1994, except 1987. Each company 
could sell multiple products, to assign a certain firm’s 4-digit SIC code, COMPUSTAT/CRSP uses 
the SIC code of the product that has greater than 50% of total sales, if none of the products accounts 
for more than 50% of the total sales, then choose a more general SIC code, which could be a 3-
digit or even 2-digit SIC code, but transferred into 4-digit by adding zero(s). In order to keep as 
many companies in COMPUSTAT/CRSP and SDC as possible, we break down the general SIC 
code into more specific 4-digit SIC code via either looking up into the corresponding NAICS code, 
                                              
24 SDC Platinum from Thomson Reuters collects detailed information on M&A transactions for both private and 
public companies. However, financial data on privately-traded firms are not available in COMPUSTAT/CRSP. 
Though data of publicly-traded firms in all industrial sectors can be found in both SDC and COMPUSTAT/CRSP, 
manufacturing sector firms dominants, and with the most environmental data available, so we restrict our focus to U.S. 
domestic and publicly-traded firms in manufacturing sector. 
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or searching for the company’s detailed information about their products if NAICS is missing. At 
the end, the SIC codes are uniformed to be specific 4-digit ones, thus merging with PACE data 
will not drop firms unnecessarily. Thus the data is a firm-level panel from 1978 to 1994 containing 
information about publicly-traded companies in U.S. manufacturing sector. Since 
COMPUSTAT/CRSP data is deflated into 1995 dollars as default, we deflate PACE data into 1995 
dollars using PPI. 
Because PACE data ends in 1994, we employ a second measure of exposure to 
environmental regulation. We take advantage of industry-level polluting data from the National 
Emission Inventory (NEI) database and EPA’s redefinitions of the Clean Air Act (CAA) on 
designating attainment and non-attainment status. First established in 1970, CAA has modified air 
quality standards for the six criteria pollutants several times: one-hour ozone (1979 standard), 
eight-hour ozone (1997 standard and 2008 standard), carbon monoxide (1971 standard), lead (1978 
standard and 2008 standard), nitrogen dioxide (1971 standard), PM-10 (1987 standard), PM-2.5 
(1997 standard and 2006 standard), and sulfur dioxide (1971 standard and 2010 standard). 
Counties that have ambient pollutant concentrations above the required standards will be 
designated as in non-attainment and be regulated. We use the EPA Green Book database to observe 
how these modifications affect the number of non-attainment counties, so that we can identify 
pre/post regulation indicator representing the overall regulatory stringency. Figure 2-5 in 
Appendix B illustrate how redefinitions of the standards for Ozone and PM increased the number 
of non-attainment counties significantly. Specifically, there is a sharp jump in the number of non-
attainment counties in 2004 due to Ozone regulations and in 2005 due to PM regulations.25  
                                              
25 Besides environmental regulation, there are some other economic regulations, especially those related to antitrust 
ones will directly affect firms M&A decisions. Following Harford (2005) and Viscusi et al. (2000), we control for 
major deregulations and related industries affected by those deregulations in Appendix Table 2-3. In this study, we 
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NEI provides detailed information about facility emission levels for criteria air pollutants, 
including CO, NH3, NOX, VOC, SO2, and PM, for years 1990, 1996-2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011. 
We aggregate facility level emissions of an industry to represent the total pollution level of that 
industry, by different pollutants. And then use a 7% assignment rule similar to Greenstone (2002) 
to classify industries into chemical-specific polluting and non-polluting categories. Figures 2-1 – 
2-4 in the Appendix B demonstrate the percentage pollution of 4-digit SIC industries for four 
pollutants across sample years. Very few industries emit more than 7% pollution, thus we also 
explore assignment rules at 2% and 3% to capture as much variation in regulation exposure as 
possible. 
With polluters and redefinitions indicator variables, we can take advantage of diff-in-diff 
analyses. However, bringing those dummies into non-linear regression models makes the 
estimation difficult to converge, so we limit our difference-in-difference analyses to be linear. For 
the non-linear logit and Poisson regressions, similar to Harford (2005) of measuring the economic 
shock, we adopt Principal component analysis (PCA). PCA is used to convert a set of possibly 
correlated variables into a comprehensive index that could capture most of the variance of those 
variables. Suppose a data matrix 𝑿 consists of data observations for a vector of variables (with 𝑑 
dimensions), each column is one variable. To utilize PCA, we need to compute the covariance 
matrix of the data matrix, and then compute the eigenvectors and corresponding eigenvalues, sort 
and choose 𝑘 eigenvectors with the largest eigenvalues to form a 𝑑 × 𝑘 dimensional matrix 𝑾, 
where every column represents an eigenvector, and then use is 𝑾 to transformthe corresponding 
eigenvector. And then use the weights vector to map each row of 𝑿 to a new subspace by 
                                              
focus on those deregulations that affect manufacturing industries (SIC from 2011 to 3999), e.g. Staggers Rail Act in 
1980 affected industry with SIC code 3743 (Railroad Equipment). 
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equation 𝒀 = 𝑾𝑻 × 𝑿 . Elements of 𝒀  represent principal component scores. Usually, the first 
principal component captures most of the information of 𝑿. Thus, we create an environmental 
regulatory stringency index by extracting the first principal component from a set of variables that 
cover industry share of emissions, polluter/non polluter indicators for different pollutants, and 
pre/post regulation indicators.26 Some descriptive statistics of key variables of analysis samples 
defined be measures of environmental regulatory stringency – PACE and redefinitions – are as 
following Table 2-1.27 Table 2-2 provides key variables descriptions. 
2.3.2. Empirical Methodology 
By treating an M&A occurrence as a binary dependent variable, we undertake logit-class 
estimation: 
[2.1]                           𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡, 𝒙𝑖𝑡) =
1
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝛽0−𝛾𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡−𝒙𝑖𝑡𝜷)
                  
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is an indicator that equals 1 if firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡 is involved in M&As. We are interested 
in the coefficient of environmental regulation stringency 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 , which could be measured by 
abatement cost or regulatory index using principal component analysis. 𝒙𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control 
variables including finance characteristics and deregulation events that could affect firms’ M&A 
decisions. We use fixed effects estimator by explicitly modeling time-invariant firm fixed effects. 
More specifically, to eliminate the incidental parameters problem, we follow Chamberlain (1980) 
                                              
26 Principal components analysis (PCA) is a popular tool of reducing the dimensionality of a data set, while keeping 
most of the information. Besides Harford (2005), in M&A related studies, researchers tend to apply PCA to identify 
common variation in several different proxies measuring the same variable, e.g., Schimdt (2015) employs PCA to 
create index of monitoring needs and advising benefits. Earlier related examples are Choi and Philippatos (1984), 
Lubatkin, Schweiger, and Weber (1999), Nikolaev (2010), and Gu and Lev (2011). In this chapter, including too many 
dummies may lead the matrix to be singular, while PCA could help find a score to capture the major characteristics 
of the environmental characteristics matrix without worrying about non-concavity of estimating logit or Poisson 
models. 
27 More information considering about the structure of these two samples can be found in Table 2-12 and 2-13 in 
Appendix B. 
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conditional fixed effects estimator. 28 We provide both pooled estimator and conditional fixed 
effects estimator in results section. Partial effects of environmental regulatory stringency on the 
response probability  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 , 𝒙𝑖𝑡)  is obtained from the partial 
derivative 
𝜕𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 , 𝒙𝑖𝑡)
𝜕 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡
=
𝛾𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝛽0−𝛾𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡−𝒙𝑖𝑡𝜷)
[1+𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝛽0−𝛾𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡−𝒙𝑖𝑡𝜷)]2
, thus the sign of the partial effect is 
the same as the sign of 𝛾. If we observe statistically positive estimates on 𝛾, then we can conclude 
that more stringent environmental regulation will raise the probability of M&A transactions. 
Firms occasionally conduct several M&A transactions in a single year, in fact, we observe 
more than 10 percent of the firms involving in M&As make more than two M&A transactions, and 
the highest number of M&As in the sample is 13. To identify environmental regulatory impacts 
on the number of transactions, rather than just whether any transaction occurred, we employ 
Poisson models as this is appropriate for events counts. The Poisson regression model specifies 
that 𝑦𝑖𝑡 given 𝒛𝑖𝑡 = (𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 , 𝒙𝑖𝑡) is Poisson distributed with density  
[2.2]                            𝑓(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝒛𝒊𝑡) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜆𝑖𝑡)𝜆𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡!
, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0, 1, 2, …                        
Given the mean parameter follows 𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝒛𝑖𝑡) = 𝜆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝒛𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜽), where 𝜽 = (𝛾, 𝜷), the 
conditional mean parameter is multiplicative when considering firm-specific fixed effects, which 
is  𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝒛𝑖𝑡 , 𝑐𝑖) = 𝜆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝒛𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜷) , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇. Similar to logit models, we can 
use pooled estimator assuming away heterogeneity, and fixed effects estimator when considering 
potential heterogeneity. The marginal effect of environmental regulatory stringency 
                                              
28 The incidental parameters problem is when using cross-sectional unit dummy variables to the logit specification, 
the estimates of coefficients will be biased unless the number of time periods is large. Katz (2001) use Monte Carlo 
experiments to compare unconditional and conditional maximum likelihood estimators of fixed -effects logit models, 
and find that when T<16, the conditional estimator outperforms the unconditional estimator, having very small amount 
of bias. 
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is 
𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝒛𝑖𝑡)
𝜕 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡
= 𝛾 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝒛𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜷), thus the sign of the marginal effect is determined by 𝛾. For example, 
if 𝛾 is positive, then a one-unit change in  𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 is associated with an increase in the number of 
times being involved in M&As 𝑦𝑖𝑡, after controlling for the other regressors. Similar to Logit 
models,  ERit is measured by PACE and by regulatory index. Compared to binary logit models, 
Poisson models provide more information about firm M&A behaviors, identifying whether more 
stringent environmental regulation will motivate firms to engage in M&A activity more intensely.  
Though linear probability models may have predicted values outside [0, 1], the estimates 
are theoretically consistent and can provide general information about the trend of the coefficients. 
Assume the same underlying profit function as linear probability models of firm i at time t; and let 
yit be an indicator that equals 1 if firm i at time t is involved in a merger and acquisition, else 0. 
Since PACE contains continuous measure of regulatory stringency, then the probability of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1 
would follow: 
[2.3]                               𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡, 𝒙𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛾𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝒙𝑖𝑡𝜷 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡            
We are interested in 𝛾, the coefficient of environmental regulation measured by PACE.  𝒙𝑖𝑡 is a 
vector of control variables that are posited to affect merger and acquisition decisions, refer to Table 
2-2 for a detailed list. 
As for the measure of regulatory stringency based on CAA redefinitions, we employ diff -
in-diff linear probability analyses similar to [2.3] as following: 
[2.4]             𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 , 𝒙𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝒙𝑖𝑡𝜷 + 𝜽𝟏 𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝑡 +
                               𝜽𝟐 𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽𝟑𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒕 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                       
where 𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕 is a vector of pollutant-specific dummy indicating whether a firm is in a 
polluting industry or not (they are defined by either 7% rule or 3%, 2% rules, and only VOC, NOX, 
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PM10 and PM2.5 are included, since we care Ozone and PM); and 𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒕 is a vector of 
dummy indicating whether it is a year post redefinition of regulation that brings significantly more 
counties being regulated. We are interested in 𝜽𝟑, which is a measure of the regulatory impact. 
We further look at how CAA affect market value of M&A firms and the value of M&A 
transactions. Market value is measured by market capitalization calculated as common shares 
outstanding multiplies stock price of fiscal year, and M&A transactions are reported by SDC. Thus 
the linear models follow: 
[2.5]                                   𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛾𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝒙𝑖𝑡𝜷 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                        
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is market value, or M&A transactions; 𝒙𝑖𝑡 is the vector of control variables; 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 is 
PACE and regulatory index. 
 
2.4. Results 
Estimated logit and Poisson models using different measures of environmental regulations 
provide similar and consistent results, suggesting that more stringent environmental regulation will 
increase the probability of M&As extensively and intensively, especially the probability of being 
target firm.  
2.4.1. General impacts on M&A activity 
We estimated general impacts of CAA on U.S. manufacturing firms M&A activity via logit 
regressions. Table 2-3 presents the estimated results from Logit models using PACE as the 
measure of environmental regulations, in which the analysis sample has annual data from 1980 to 
1994 (except 1987). We investigate firms’ decision on being acquirer, target, and either of them, 
and denote the dummy dependent variable as acquirer, target, and M&A separately. Pooled logit 
and conditional fixed-effects logit estimators are reported, and the results demonstrate that 
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environmental regulation measured by PACE indeed has positive impacts on M&A activity. 
Considering about whether or not to buy another firm under environmental regulation, the 
estimated coefficient of PACE is 0.027 from fixed-effects logit model, which means that one-unit 
(10 million 1995 dollars) increase in abatement cost will increase the log odds of being acquirer 
(versus not being acquirer) by 0.027, holding all other factors constant. More specifically, 
according to the calculation of marginal impact based on fixed-effects logit model, such marginal 
impact of PACE on the probability of being an acquirer is 0.7% at the mean of PACE. Statistically 
positive impacts are also found when studying on whether firms choose to be a target or not, and 
whether to involve in M&A transactions, from both pooled logit estimator and fixed-effects logit 
estimator, and the magnitudes of marginal impacts are 0.2% and 0.3% separately (see Table 2-5, 
Panel a, column (1)). 
Anti-trust deregulation does not significantly affect the acquirer decision making, but has 
significant negative impacts on probability of being acquired. Economic shocks seem to have little 
impact on M&A decision making, however, the market share does have significantly positive 
impacts, which means that firms with larger market share will behave more actively in M&A 
transactions. Coefficients of other control variables that are supposed to affect M&As decisions 
behave similarly to those found elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Harford, 2005).29  
The results are similar when using regulatory index based on information of NEI and CAA 
redefinitions. The analysis sample contains data of more recent years from 1990 to 2011, with 
gaps. Since Hausman tests of choosing between pooled logit and fixed-effects logit models suggest 
                                              
29 We estimate models that are similar to Harford (2005) by excluding environmental regulations from [2.1], and the 
results return similar impacts of financial characteristics on M&As, e.g., asset growth and leverage have positive 
impacts. See Appendix Table 2-5 for estimated logit and Poisson models for sample when use PACE as a measure of 
environmental regulations. Harford (2005) includes logit models only.  
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that fixed-effects logit model is preferable, Table 2-4 presents fixed-effects estimators only, and 
the first three columns are fixed-effects logit estimators, using 2% rule.30 Regulation index is 
generated as described in data section using principal component analysis. Variables that are used 
to generate the regulation index are polluting dummy, percentage of pollutants level, and 
redefinition of CAA on Ozone and PM. Table 2-5 shows that the impacts of environmental 
regulation on acquirer, target, and M&A decisions are positive, though not statistically significant. 
Compared to results in Table 2-3, there are no significant impacts from other control variables, 
except asset growth, market share, and productivity.  
Corresponding marginal impacts of environmental regulation based on different models 
and measures are reported in Table 2-5. 
2.4.2. Intensive impacts on M&A frequency 
Since firms may conduct multiple M&A transactions in certain years, we study further on 
how environmental regulation will affect the frequency of being involved in M&As. Table 2-6 
presents the estimated Poisson models based on PACE measure, and the last two columns of Table 
2-4 reports the estimated fixed-effects Poisson models based on regulatory index measure. Results 
suggest that environmental regulation will increase M&A frequency, both on the number of times 
being acquirer and the number of times being target. Thus from an intensive point of view, more 
stringent environmental regulation will motivate firms to seek for M&A transactions more 
actively. 
 
                                              
30 We also conduct random-effects logit regressions and random-effects Poisson regressions, Hausman tests of fixed-
effects and random-effects also reject the null, and suggest that fixed-effects models are preferable. Results about 
using 7% and 3% polluter/non-polluter rules are presented in Table 2-15 and 2-16 in Appendix B. Results are 
consistent across different designation rules.  
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2.4.3. Robustness Checks 
The results are robust to a variety of robustness checks. First of all, estimated linear 
probability models [2.3] and [2.4] provide evidence supporting that environmental regulations 
have positive impacts on the probability of being acquirer, target, and of being involved in M&As. 
More specifically, ceteris paribus, one-unit (10 million 1995 dollars) increase in abatement cost 
will increase the probability of a firm being acquirer by 0.2%, by 0.3% if a firm chooses to sell, 
and by 0.3% if a firm is involved in M&A activities. It also increases the market value of firms 
conducting M&As if PACE is higher. Ten million dollars increase in PACE will lead to about 31 
million dollars increase in M&A firms’ market value, and the value of M&A transactions will 
increase by 0.3 million dollars. Table 2-7 provides estimated results of linear models for both 
measures of environmental regulations.  
When estimate difference-in-difference model [2.4] using CAA redefinitions as measure 
of environmental regulatory stringency, we vary the specifications by including variable represents 
percentage pollutants a 4-digit industry produces to total pollution of each pollutants or not, 
combining pollutants VOC and NOX into Ozone or not, and combining PM10 and PM2.5 into PM 
or not. Results in Table 2-7, Panel b show that there is no significant impact of CAA on M&As 
for most of the cases, but there is positive effect on M&A firms market value. Table 2-17 and 2-
18 in Appendix B provide estimated linear models using 7% rule and 3% rule separately. The 
results are sensitive to polluter/non-polluter designation rules. More specifically, when the 
designation rule is 7%, more stringent of the regulation on VOC, manufacturing firms will conduct 
more M&As, and behave as acquirer more often; when the designation rule is 3%, such effect is 
only significant on the probability of being target. This might be because that the variation of 
polluters and non-polluters are not enough. Though the results vary because of different 
62  
 
 
designation rules, the estimates on M&A firms’ market value are significantly positive for most of 
the cases, which indirectly proves that environmental regulation does have some impacts on 
M&As. 
Since our measures of environmental regulatory stringency are at the industry-level, we 
aggregate our firm-level data into industry-level, and then employ similar analyses as we 
undertook using firm-level data.31 Table 2-8 presents similar results to previous results based on 
firm-level data. Results of linear models based on PACE measure suggest that more stringent 
environmental regulation will increase market value and M&A transactions of manufacturing 
industries. When dependent variables are binary indicator of whether an industry conducts M&A 
or not, the impacts of environmental regulation on M&As are positive but not significant. Non-
significance is because M&As are among firms instead of industries, and industry-level binary 
indicator are over-generalized. Differing from binary dependent variables, Poisson regressions of 
industry-level acquirer/target counts on regulation and control variables are more reliable, and they 
return positive and significant coefficients of interests based on PACE measure. The corresponding 
marginal impacts of environmental regulation on industry-level acquirer and target counts are 
0.060 and 0.045 when use PACE measure. When use regulatory index measure, such impact on 
the number of times being target is positive and statistically significant, and robust to polluter/non-
polluter designation rules.   
Moreover, when control variables of financial characteristics are excluded, and only 
environmental regulations, anti-trust deregulation, market share and productivity are included as 
                                              
31 To aggregate firm-level data into industry-level data, all the level data of firms such as PACE, market value, 
transactions, capital expenditures, and sales, are summed. As for the ratio data, especially the financial ratios, such as 
market-to-book ratio, equity/asset ratio, and cash flow, we use the mean of all firms sharing the same four-digit SIC, 
weighted by firms’ market shares, to represent the market-to-book ratio of that industry. 
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explanatory variables, linear models return similar results but with slightly higher magnitudes 
when other financial controls are included. And this is especially significant for logit models using 
PACE measure, e.g., the marginal impacts of environmental regulations on target is 0.007 when 
finance controls are excluded, which is about 3.5 times of such impacts when finance controls are 
included. However, marginal impacts on frequency of being target is smaller than when finance 
controls are included. When use regulatory index, such pattern exists but the differences are with 
much smaller magnitudes (refer to Panel c in Table 2-5). Thus, comparing to logit models without 
controlling for firms’ finance characteristics, such positive impacts are lower in magnitudes, 
suggesting upward bias when neglecting financial control variables; while Poisson models without 
control variable induce downward bias. This gives us an idea that when firms are making one-shot 
decision on whether to conduct M&A transactions, financial performance seems to be more 
important than environmental regulations; however, when firms are considering about M&As 
repeatedly, environmental regulatory impacts tend to be growing.  
Another issue is that there may be dynamic effects. To consider this, we include the lag of 
regulation and lag of dependent variables in the regressions. Table 2-9 provides results from 
dynamic models based on firm-level data. Linear models based on PACE measure bring both the 
first lag of PACE and the first lag of dependent variables, and then use Arellano-Bond methods by 
treating PACE and lag of dependent variables as endogenous. Results suggest positive impacts of 
environmental regulations on M&As. Since the coefficients on lagged dependent variables are not 
significant in most of the linear regressions, and because it is difficult to conduct Arellano-Bond 
in non-linear models, we include only lag of regulation in Logit/Poisson models, PACE measure 
returns similar results to Table 2-3, suggesting that the positive regulation impacts are not due to 
dynamics, and that the first lag of PACE has positive impacts on M&As as well. Results based on 
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regulatory index measure are similar to results in Table 2-4 except that the regulation impacts are 
significantly positive on M&A. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
Prior to implementing environmental regulations, it is important to understand the ways in 
which firms are likely to respond. This chapter examines manufacturing firms’ M&A activities 
under CAA regulation while controlling comprehensively for relevant environmental and financial 
characteristics. Results suggest that more stringent environmental regulations will motive 
manufacturing firms to conduct more M&As, and that the market value of M&A firms will 
increase. Though difference-in-difference estimates based on redefinition measure varies slightly 
due to different polluter/non-polluter designation rules, the impacts of the CAA on the market 
value of M&A firms are consistently positive and significant, which supports the idea that firms 
will be motivated by more stringent environmental regulation indirectly. Different measurements 
of environmental regulatory stringency do not impact the results dramatically, especially when 
dependent variable is the number of times behaving as target during a certain year. This is true 
when we aggregate firm-level data to the industry-level, and when we allow for dynamics into the 
models. 
Two potential extensions of this chapter include: (1) environmental regulatory impacts on 
demand side; and (2) environmental regulatory impacts on cross-border M&As. This chapter 
studies how supply side will react under environmental regulations through M&As. One potential 
result of more M&As generated monopoly power is that consumers will pay higher price, thus 
there might be consumer loss when environmental regulations become more stringent. To identify 
both supply-side and demand-side welfare can help understand how environmental regulations 
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will affect the social welfare. There are papers studying economic regulation impacts on 
international M&As, but it is not clear whether environmental regulations across countries play a 
role of motivating firms to conduct cross-border M&As. This will help to identify the global 
impacts of environmental regulations.  
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Appendix A: Tables 
Table 2-1: Descriptive statistics of analysis samples defined by environmental regulatory 
measures 
(PACE measure and CAA Redefinitions measure) 
 Panel a: Summary statistics of key variables (PACE) 
Variable         Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Abatement Costs 9.242 24.205 0 322.964 
Market share 0.11 0.22 0.00 1 
Stock Market Return 0.18 2.20 -0.99 150.61 
Market/book ratio 2.97 27.95 -1,480.26 1,985.29 
Equity/assets ratio 0.48 0.48 -25.55 1.00 
Asset growth 0.13 0.59 -0.92 22.77 
R&D intensity 0.92 22.31 -10.01 1,639 
Leverage  0.50 0.38 0.00 15.55 
Labor productivity 123.69 112.41 -3,014.5 4,331.625 
Cash flow -1.27 28.77 -1,788.46 26.63 
Profitability  0.06 0.30 -7.99 0.82 
 Panel b: Summary statistics of key variables (CAA Redefinitions) 
Variable         Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Regulation index -0.28 1.83 -0.76 19.42 
Market share 0.08 0.19 0.00 1 
Stock Market Return 0.21 5.49 -1.00 427.57 
Market/book ratio 3.50 69.54 -2,500 6,526.26 
Equity/assets ratio 0.21 7.32 -666.90 1.00 
Asset growth 0.18 1.85 -0.98 159.65 
R&D intensity 4.79 127.65 -90.38 12,522.1 
Leverage  0.74 7.17 0.00 667.47 
Labor productivity 237.50 281.23 -5.5 8,422.50 
Cash flow -7.25 174.79 -14,675.3 116.03 
Profitability  -0.12 1.51 -126.31 8.83 
Note: The total sample when use PACE measure contains about 2,800 companies for each observed year, making the 
total company-year observation be 54,329. However, due to missing values of key variables, the final analysis sample 
contains 14,000 observations. Those missing values mainly come from COMPUSTAT/CRSP finance characteristics, 
which is generally due to older data and inactive firms, thus will not affect our estimates dramatically. The total sample 
when use CAA redefinitions measure contains 39,481 company-year observations. However, due to missing values 
of key variables, the final analysis sample contains 17,924 observations. 
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Table 2-2: Control Variables 
Model Variable Data Variable 
Market share of the firm Market value of the firm: csho*prcc_f: 
common shares outstanding*stock price of 
fiscal year, then divide it by total value of the 
industry in fiscal year 
Stock market return the increase in stock price prcc_f 
Market/book ratio prcc_f/bkvlps: stock price of fiscal year/book 
value per share 
Equity/asset ratio ceq/at: total common or ordinary equity/ total 
assets 
or 
(bkvlps/at)*csho: (book value per share/total 
assets)*common shares outstanding 
Cash flow ebitda/sale: the ratio of earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
to total sales 
Asset growth rate The rate of growth of total assets: at 
Profitability  ebitda/at: the ratio of earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
to total assets 
R&D intensity xrd/sale : R&D expenditure/total sales 
leverage lt/at: total liabilities/total assets 
productivity sale/emp: total sales/employees 
Deregulation event dummy  Refer to Table 2-11 in Appendix B 
Economic shock index First principal component from seven 
economic shock variables: cash flow, asset 
turnover (at/sale), R&D (xrd), capital 
expenditures (capx), employee growth, 
productivity, and sales growth 
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Table 2-3: Logit models when use PACE measure 
 acquirer target M&A 
 pooled FE pooled FE pooled FE 
PACE 0.001 
(0.73) 
0.027*** 
(4.31) 
0.003** 
(2.21) 
0.034*** 
(4.98) 
0.001 
(1.04) 
0.034*** 
(5.31) 
Deregulation 0.226 
(0.79) 
0.166 
(0.45) 
-1.402* 
(-1.95) 
-1.306** 
(-2.09) 
-0.094 
(-0.32) 
-0.112 
(-0.33) 
Economic shock 0.175* 
(1.93) 
0.026 
(0. 46) 
0.140** 
(1.99) 
-0.015 
(-0.28) 
0.149* 
(1.85) 
-0.029 
(-0.54) 
Market share 1.421*** 
(9.97) 
1.525*** 
(3.58) 
1.332*** 
(9.24) 
0.573 
(1.26) 
1.436*** 
(10.04) 
1.223*** 
(3.01) 
Market/book -0.000 
(-0.48) 
-0.000 
(-0.01) 
0.001 
(1.26) 
0.011*** 
(2.70) 
0.000 
(0.57) 
0.005* 
(1.91) 
Equity/asset 1.110** 
(2.06) 
-0.882 
(-1.09) 
0.590*** 
(2.62) 
1.508*** 
(2.94) 
0.779*** 
(2.56) 
1.040** 
(2.34) 
R&D intensity -0.005 
(-0.35) 
-0.001 
(-0.15) 
0.005** 
(2.39) 
-0.000 
(-0.10) 
0.005** 
(1.97) 
-0.000 
(-0.01) 
Leverage 1.185** 
(2.10) 
-0.647 
(-0.77) 
1.057*** 
(3.60) 
2.436*** 
(3.95) 
1.088*** 
(3.17) 
1.739*** 
(3.29) 
Stock market return -0.008 
(-0.67) 
-0.014 
(-0.68) 
0.011 
(1.17) 
0.026* 
(1.76) 
0.010 
(1.16) 
0.031* 
(1.66) 
Asset growth 0.405*** 
(5.33) 
0.875*** 
(9.38) 
-0.118 
(-0.96) 
-0.092 
(-1.12) 
0.252*** 
(4.58) 
0.454*** 
(6.22) 
Productivity 0.001** 
(2.49) 
0.001** 
(2.17) 
0.001*** 
(3.05) 
0.004*** 
(6.04) 
0.001*** 
(3.18) 
0.004*** 
(6.00) 
Intercept -3.124*** 
(-5.72) 
- -3.100*** 
(-12.08) 
- -2.542*** 
(-7.95) 
- 
Obs 14,000 6,911 14,000 6,219 14,000 7,804 
Note: *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. Corresponding test statistics are in parentheses. 
Comparing to pooled logit models, FE logit will drop observations where the dependent variables are all 0 or 1 across 
years, meaning no status change over time. Pooled logit models are reported here as a baseline, Hausman tests suggest 
that FE logit is preferable. 
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Table 2-4: Estimated models when use regulatory index based on information of NEI and CAA 
redefinitions (2% rule) 
 Logit models (fixed effects) Poisson models (fixed effects) 
 Acquirer Target M&A Acquirer counts Target counts 
Regulation index 0.010 
(0.23) 
0.062 
(1.39) 
0.027 
(0.68) 
0.029 
(1.12) 
0.071** 
(2.32) 
Deregulation -0.321 
(-1.05) 
0.284 
(0.88) 
0.033 
(0.13) 
-0.255 
(-1.32) 
-0.108 
(-0.43) 
Economic shock 0.047 
(0.86) 
-0.015 
(-0.48) 
-0.039 
(-1.35) 
0.040** 
(2.36) 
-0.007 
(-0.36) 
Market share 0.726* 
(1.83) 
-0.791* 
(-1.83) 
0.439 
(1.14) 
0.607*** 
(3.23) 
-0.888*** 
(-3.32) 
Market/book -0.000 
(-0.65) 
-0.000 
(-0.41) 
-0.001 
(-1.16) 
-0.000 
(-0.60) 
-0.000 
(-0.18) 
Equity/asset 0.861 
(1.50) 
0.060 
(0.29) 
0.255 
(0.77) 
0.396 
(0.97) 
0.008 
(0.04) 
R&D intensity 0.000 
(0.33) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
-0.000 
(-0.96) 
0.000 
(0.49) 
0.000 
(0.44) 
Leverage 0.515 
(0.87) 
0.068 
(0.33) 
0.259 
(0.79) 
0.153 
(0.36) 
0.014 
(0.08) 
Stock market return -0.033 
(-1.50) 
0.001 
(0.16) 
-0.014 
(-1.11) 
-0.021 
(-1.39) 
0.006 
(1.04) 
Asset growth 0.610*** 
(11.58) 
-0.033 
(-0.77) 
0.384*** 
(9.14) 
0.252*** 
(12.48) 
-0.027 
(-0.80) 
Productivity -0.000 
(-0.60) 
-0.001** 
(-2.13) 
-0.000 
(-0.92) 
-0.000** 
(-2.13) 
-0.000** 
(-2.04) 
Obs 8,949 7,345 9,847 9,231 7,440 
Note: *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. Corresponding test statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 2-5: Marginal effects of environmental regulation by estimated models and measures 
Model PACE 
(1) 
Index (7%) 
(2) 
Index (3%) 
(3) 
Index (2%) 
(4) 
Panel a: Firm-level data (control financial characteristics) 
FE-Logit  
(acquirer) 
0.007*** 
(4.31) 
-0.011 
(-1.01) 
-0.006 
(-0.55) 
0.002 
(0.22) 
FE-Logit  
(target) 
0.002* 
(1.85) 
0.015 
(1.06) 
0.012 
(0.92) 
0.015 
(1.39) 
FE-Logit  
(mergers) 
0.003** 
(2.27) 
-0.000 
(-0.02) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.007 
(0.68) 
FE-Poisson 
(acquirer) 
0.044 
(1.37) 
0.002 
(0.04) 
0.028 
(0.63) 
0.040 
(1.02) 
FE-Poisson  
(target) 
0.290** 
(1.99) 
0.051** 
(2.20) 
0.070** 
(2.25) 
0.060** 
(2.19) 
Panel b: Industry-level data (control financial characteristics) 
FE-Logit  
(acquirer) 
0.001 
(1.05) 
0.012 
(0.91) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
0.007 
(0.35) 
FE-Logit  
(target) 
0.001 
(0.51) 
0.006 
(0.38) 
-0.001 
(-0.08) 
0.026 
(1.41) 
FE-Logit  
(mergers) 
0.001 
(0.65) 
0.038 
(0.86) 
0.023 
(0.61) 
0.065 
(1.55) 
FE-Poisson 
(acquirer) 
0.060*** 
(2.82) 
-0.001 
(-0.16) 
0.008 
(1.16) 
0.008 
(1.11) 
FE-Poisson  
(target) 
0.045*** 
(2.64) 
0.021** 
(2.21) 
0.031** 
(2.00) 
0.024* 
(1.67) 
Panel c: Firm-level data (without financial characteristics) 
FE-Logit  
(acquirer) 
0.006*** 
(4.39) 
-0.012 
(-0.94) 
-0.006 
(-0.53) 
0.003 
(0.32) 
FE-Logit  
(target) 
0.007*** 
(5.68) 
0.014 
(1.06) 
0.012 
(0.92) 
0.015 
(1.39) 
FE-Logit  
(mergers) 
0.007*** 
(5.89) 
-0.000 
(-0.02) 
-0.000 
(-0.02) 
0.007 
(0.67) 
FE-Poisson 
(acquirer) 
0.026*** 
(4.28) 
0.004 
(0.13) 
0.021 
(0.68) 
0.030 
(1.15) 
FE-Poisson  
(target) 
0.035*** 
(4.79) 
0.050** 
(2.40) 
0.070** 
(2.45) 
0.060** 
(2.37) 
Note: Measures of environmental regulations are marked by PACE and Index in the first row of the table. The marginal 
effects are calculated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. The prediction rule for FE-Logit models is to 
predict the probability of a positive outcome assuming that the fixed effect is zero. The prediction rule for FE-Poisson 
models is the number of events. Thus a 0.007 marginal effect from FE-Logit model is interpreted as: at the mean of 
environmental regulatory stringency, one-unit increase in regulatory stringency will increase the probability of 
changing the dependent variable from 0 to 1 by 0.7%. And a 0.290 marginal effect from FE-Poisson model represents 
that one unit increase in regulatory stringency will increase the counts of M&As by 0.290. 
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Table 2-6: Poisson models when use PACE measure 
 Number of times being acquirer Number of times being target 
 pooled FE pooled FE 
PACE 0.001 
(1.25) 
0.016*** 
(4.51) 
0.005*** 
(6.21) 
0.020*** 
(5.63) 
Deregulation -0.267 
(-0.83) 
-0.201 
(-0.70) 
-1.024 
(-1.54) 
-0.993** 
(-2.03) 
Economic shock 0.133*** 
(7.25) 
0.045** 
(2.34) 
0.127*** 
(7.19) 
0.018 
(0.86) 
Market share 1.346 *** 
(20.01) 
1.058*** 
(4.23) 
1.443*** 
(16.81) 
0.253 
(0.87) 
Market/book 0.000 
(0.25) 
0.001 
(0.23) 
0.001* 
(1.77) 
0.007*** 
(2.76) 
Equity/asset 0.906*** 
(2.70) 
0.411 
(0.60) 
1.085*** 
(2.78) 
1.637*** 
(3.79) 
R&D intensity -0.014 
(-0.69) 
-0.000 
(-0.00) 
0.004*** 
(3.81) 
0.001 
(0.45) 
Leverage 1.024*** 
(2.90) 
0.618 
(0.88) 
1.387*** 
(3.39) 
2.721*** 
(5.34) 
Stock market return 0.001 
(0.14) 
-0.007 
(-0.62) 
0.004 
(0.47) 
0.014 
(1.24) 
Asset growth 0.162*** 
(8.31) 
0.380*** 
(8.87) 
-0.209 
(-1.60) 
-0.099 
(-1.47) 
Productivity 0.001*** 
(4.63) 
0.001*** 
(3.34) 
0.001*** 
(4.85) 
0.002*** 
(6.97) 
Intercept -2.740*** 
(-8.00) 
- -3.292*** 
(-8.27) 
- 
Obs 14,000 7,003 14,000 6,269 
Note: *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. Corresponding test statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 2-7: Linear models when use PACE measure 
 Acquirer Target M&A Market value M&A transactions 
Panel a: PACE Measure 
PACE 0.002*** 
(4.64) 
0.003*** 
(6.32) 
0.003*** 
(6.16) 
31.0*** 
(3.59) 
0.3 
(1.08) 
Panel b: Regulatory Index Measure 
With Percentage, Four Pollutants     
Inter_VOC -0.068 
(-1.38) 
0.005 
(0.11) 
-0.045 
(-0.86) 
12808.94** 
(2.00) 
-1173.01 
(-1.37) 
Inter_NOX 0.124 
(1.35) 
-0.065 
(-0.82) 
0.093 
(0.94) 
9394.666 
(1.41) 
819.807 
(0.65) 
Inter_PM10 -0.254* 
(-1.92) 
0.120 
(1.06) 
-0.199 
(-1.41) 
11144.92 
(1.55) 
1786.433 
(1.30) 
Inter_PM25 0.110 
(1.13) 
-0.109 
(-1.31) 
0.052 
(0.50) 
-751.118 
(-0.14) 
- 
Without Percentage, Four Pollutants    
Inter_VOC -0.084* 
(-1.72) 
-0.002 
(-0.04) 
-0.061 
(-1.18) 
7702.518 
(1.14) 
-1130.552 
(-1.36) 
Inter_NOX 0.088 
(0.98) 
-0.080 
(-1.03) 
0.054 
(0.57) 
-2368.109 
(-0.34) 
667.58 
(0.54) 
Inter_PM10 -0.180 
(-1.42) 
0.150 
(1.37) 
-0.127 
(-0.94) 
17187.97** 
(2.00) 
1791.071 
(1.39) 
Inter_PM25 0.104 
(1.08) 
-0.109 
(-1.32) 
0.048 
(0.47) 
-3697.118 
(-0.66) 
- 
Without Percentage, combine PM     
Inter_VOC -0.091* 
(-1.87) 
0.005 
(0.13) 
-0.064 
(-1.24) 
8640.993 
(1.29) 
-1130.552 
(-1.36) 
Inter_NOX 0.050 
(0.59) 
-0.041 
(-0.56) 
0.037 
(0.41) 
-462.644 
(-0.06) 
667.58 
(0.54) 
Inter_PM -0.030 
(-0.40) 
-0.008 
(-0.12) 
-0.057 
(-0.74) 
9620.064 
(1.56) 
1791.071 
(1.39) 
Without Percentage, Ozone and PM    
Inter_Ozone -0.067 
(-1.52) 
0.034 
(1.10) 
-0.063 
(-1.36) 
9183.563* 
(1.74) 
56.753 
(0.08) 
Inter_PM 0.002 
(0.03) 
0.024 
(0.59) 
-0.018 
(-0.34) 
6830.128 
(0.93) 
1346.996 
(1.01) 
Without Percentage, all in one     
Inter_env -0.047 
(-1.54) 
-0.029 
(-1.10) 
-0.058* 
(-1.78) 
10487.21** 
(2.02) 
964.226 
(1.12) 
Note: *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. Corresponding test statistics are in parentheses. 
PACE varies at industry level. The analysis sample covers year from 1980 to 1994, except 1987. Dependent variables 
Acquirer, Target, and M&A are binary variables; Market value is measured by market capitalization calculated by 
common shares outstanding multiplies stock price of fiscal year, with units as million 1995 dollars; M&A transactions’ 
units are million 1995 dollars. Analysis sample when use CAA redefinitions measure covers manufacturing firms 
from year 1996 to 2002, and year 2005, 2008, and 2011.  
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Table 2-8: Estimated models using industry-level data for different measures of environmental 
regulations (PACE and regulatory index) 
Note: The units of PACE is 10 million dollars. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. 
Corresponding test statistics are in parentheses. Linear models based on NEI sample return similar pattern as using 
firm-level data, but none of the coefficients of interaction terms (coefficients of interests) is significant except when 
the dependent variable is market value, Ozone regulation has positive impacts, thus we do  not report here. The full 
NEI industry-level sample contains 4,924 observations, PACE industry-level sample contains 7,724 observations. Due 
to missing values in key variables used in analyses, the analysis sample of NEI sample has 1,776 observations, while 
PACE sample has 2,214 observations.  
  
  PACE  
 
Acquirer Target M&A 
Market 
Value 
M&A 
transactions 
Acquirer 
Counts 
Target 
Counts 
Linear Models  
PACE 0.002* 
(1.80) 
0.001 
(0.64) 
0.001 
(0.81) 
107.308*** 
(4.70) 
2.125 
(0.96) 
- - 
Obs 2,214 2,214 2,214 1,548 1,192 - - 
Logit/Poisson Models  
PACE 0.008 
(1.37) 
0.003 
(0.53) 
0.003 
(0.72) 
- - 0.011*** 
(4.39) 
0.012*** 
(4.65) 
Obs 1,977 1,997 1,884 - - 2,133 2,078 
  Index (2% rule)  
 
acquirer target M&A 
Market 
Value 
M&A 
transactions 
Acquirer 
Counts 
Target 
Counts 
Logit/Poisson Models  
Regulation 
index 
0.029 
(0.35) 
0.107 
(1.42) 
0.272 
(1.60) 
- - 0.014 
(1.13) 
0.026* 
(1.80) 
Obs 1,109 1,375 912   1,776 1,731 
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Table 2-9: Estimated models using firm-level data for different measures of environmental 
regulations (PACE and regulatory index) 
Note: *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. Corresponding test statistics are in parentheses. 
Linear models based on NEI sample return similar pattern as using firm-level data, but none of the coefficients of 
interaction terms (coefficients of interests) is significant, thus we do not report here.  
  PACE  
 
Acquirer Target M&A 
Market 
Value 
M&A 
transactions 
Acquirer 
Counts 
Target 
Counts 
Linear Models  
PACE 0.001* 
(1.89) 
0.001* 
(1.91) 
0.001** 
(2.06) 
59.423*** 
(2.73) 
-1.433 
(-0.35) 
- - 
Lag (1) 
PACE 
0.001 
(1.38) 
0.003*** 
(4.93) 
0.003*** 
(3.95) 
42.004* 
(1.94) 
5.551 
(1.39) 
- - 
Obs 11,475 11,475 11,475 2,724 1,543 - - 
Logit/Poisson Models  
PACE 0.015 
(1.61) 
0.061 
(1.13) 
0.010* 
(1.71) 
- - 0.005 
(1.05) 
0.003 
(0.82) 
Lag (1) 
PACE 
0.006 
(0.72) 
0.048*** 
(5.34) 
0.035*** 
(4.36) 
  0.010* 
(1.78) 
0.022*** 
(4.47) 
Obs 5,516 4,980 6,224 - - 5,591 5,003 
  Index (2% Rule)  
 
acquirer target M&A 
Market 
Value 
M&A 
transactions 
Acquirer 
Counts 
Target 
Counts 
Logit/Poisson Models  
Regu_index 0.045 
(0.37) 
0.132 
(0.97) 
0.344** 
(2.19) 
- - -0.024 
(-0.26) 
0.055 
(0.68) 
Lag (3) 
Regu_index 
0.027 
(0.21) 
-0.029 
(-0.21) 
-0.080 
(-0.54) 
  0.044 
(0.47) 
-0.093 
(-1.10) 
Obs 4,798 3,788 5,265 - - 5,137 3,922 
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Appendix B: Other Information 
Tables and figures in the Appendix are to provide: (1) some background information about 
the data, deregulation events, structure of analysis samples, polluter/non-polluter related 
distributions, and CAA redefinitions; (2) some more details of estimates from models with pure 
financial control variables by excluding environmental regulations as a first step to see whether 
our data by itself behaves dramatically different from that used in finance literature; (3) estimated 
models based on other polluter/non-polluter assignment rules (7% and 3%). 
a. Tables: background information 
Firm-level financial characteristics can be found in COMPUSTAT/CRSP. 
COMPUSTAT/CRSP includes many variables from firms’ balance sheets. Table 2-10 lists the 
data variables and corresponding descriptions that are used to generate our model control variables 
of firms’ financial characteristics in Table 2-2, which are commonly adopted in M&A empirical 
literature. 
Table 2-10: Data variables and related measurement of units: 
Data variable Description Units 
cusip Company identifier id 
ebitda Earnings before interests millions 
at Total value of assets millions 
bkvlps Book value per share dollars 
capx Capital expenditures millions 
ceq Common/ordinary equity-total millions 
csho Common shares outstanding millions 
emp Number of company workers thousands 
lt Liabilities – total  millions 
sale Net sales millions 
xad Advertising expense millions 
xrd R&D expense millions 
Prcc_f Price close, annual, fiscal year dollars  
Source: Wharton Research Data Services, https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ 
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Harford (2005) and Viscusi et. al. (2005) point out that anti-trust related deregulations will 
trigger merger waves – during when the probability of M&As is higher than the unconditiona l 
expected probability. Table 2-11 lists major economic deregulatory events from 1978 to 2007, and 
will be used to generate deregulation indicator by time and industry affected. For example, an 
industry with 4-digit SIC 3743 in 1980 would have a deregulation indicator equal 1. Deregulation 
indicator is used to control impacts from other regulations, and could capture some of the time and 
industrial effects.  
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Table 2-11: Major Economic Deregulatory Events: 1978-2007 
year Deregulatory event Industry affected (4-digit SIC) 
1978 Airline Deregulation Act 
Natural Gas Policy Act 
4512,4513,4522,4581;4729 
1311,1321,1389;4922,4923,4924 
1979 Deregulation of satellite earth stations (FCC) 
Urgent-mail exemption (Postal Service) 
4899 
4311 
1980 Motor Carrier Reform Act 
Household Goods Transportation Act 
Staggers Rail Act 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act 
International Air Transportation Competition Act 
Deregulation of cable television (FCC) 
Deregulation of customer premises equipment and 
enhanced services (FCC) 
4213,4214 
 
3743;4011,4013 
6021,6022 
 
4512,4513,4522 
3663,4833,4841 
1981 Decontrol of crude oil and refined petroleum 
products (executive order) 
Deregulation of radio (FCC) 
1311, 2911 
 
2517,3663, 4832, 5064, 5731 
1982 Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act 
AT&T settlement 
6021,6022,6082,6091,6099 
3663 
1984 Cable television deregulation act 
Shipping act 
3663,4833,4841 
4412,4424,4432,4449,4481,4489 
1987 Elimination of fairness doctrine (FCC) 3651 
1989 Natural gas wellhead decontrol act of 1989 1311,1321,1389;4922,4923,4924 
1991 Federal deposit insurance corporation improvement 
act 
6021,6022,6082,6091,6099 
1992 Cable television consumer protection and 
competition act 
Energy policy act 
FERC order 636 
3663,4833,4841 
 
1311,1321,1389;4922,4923,4924 
3699,4911 
1993 Elimination of state regulation of cellular telephone 
rates 
Negotiated rates act 
3661,4812 
4212,4213 
1994 Trucking industry and regulatory reform act 
Interstate banking and branching efficiency act 
4212,4213 
6021,6022,6082,6091,6099 
1995 Interstate commerce commission termination act 40-45 
1996 Telecommunications act 
FERC order 888 
3663,4812,4813,4822 
3699,4911 
1999 FERC order 2000 3699,4911 
2000 FERC order 637 3699,4911 
2005 Energy Policy Act 2005 3699,4911 
2007 FERC order 890 3699,4911 
Note: All the deregulation events and industries affected from 1978 to 1996 are summarized by Harford (2005) and 
Viscusi et. al. (2005). After 1996, most active deregulations are in energy, and information is obtained from Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 
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After merging data from SDC, COMPUSTAT/CRSP, PACE and NEI, we first count the 
proportion of firms involved in mergers to all firms, and further among all M&As by each year, 
the number of M&As occurring within the same industry, the number of polluting acquirer, and 
polluting target. Moreover, the number of observations in analysis sample is different from total 
sample because of missing values, we test whether our analysis sample could be a representative 
random sample from population by comparing to the remaining sample. Table 2-12 provide those 
information for sample when use PACE measure, Table 2-13 provide such information for sample 
when use regulatory index measure. From these two tables, we can see that there are big enough 
variations in M&As for identification, and the analysis samples are approximately representative 
random samples, since the analysis samples are approximately identical to excluded samples.  
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Table 2-12: Descriptive statistics when use PACE measure 
Year 
Panel a: Sample with full information for regression 
Mergers Same industry Polluting acquirer Polluting target 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
1980 547 4 4 0 2 0 3 0 
1981 464 46 36 10 35 6 13 4 
1982 764 105 75 30 83 8 43 3 
1983 728 186 127 59 141 9 84 7 
1984 740 265 151 114 194 21 137 11 
1985 858 142 91 51 89 18 69 17 
1986 821 189 116 73 132 16 92 15 
1988 827 210 144 66 130 14 108 14 
1989 769 271 161 110 174 18 159 17 
1990 738 291 178 113 188 20 160 18 
1991 751 279 178 101 172 19 146 18 
1992 775 301 185 116 187 27 156 20 
1993 1,055 394 240 154 254 23 193 23 
1994 1,040 440 299 141 293 21 215 24 
Panel b: Comparison of means for analysis sample and excluded sample 
 
Variables 
Analysis Sample Excluded Sample  
ttest of means (p-value) mean obs mean obs 
Market share 0.11 14,000 0.11 26,992 -1.40 (0.16) 
Stock Market Return 0.18 14,000 0.31 21,363 1.03 (0.30) 
Market/book ratio 2.97 14,000 2.41 26,806 -0.80 (0.43) 
Equity/assets ratio 0.48 14,000 -0.25 35,903 -0.95 (0.34) 
Asset growth 0.13 14,000 0.38 29,000 5.12 (0.00) 
R&D intensity 0.92 14,000 1.17 17,072 0.62 (0.54) 
Leverage 0.50 14,000 1.15 35,931 0.95 (0.34) 
Labor productivity 123.69 14,000 127.42 31,643 0.60 (0.55) 
Cash flow -1.27 14,000 -1.10 34,930 0.47 (0.64) 
Profitability 0.06 14,000 -0.03 35,670 -1.48 (0.14) 
Note: Panel a provides description of the structure of M&As in analysis sample, especially the number of mergers, 
the number of mergers in same industry, the number of polluting acquirer and target. Whether an acquirer or a target 
is a polluter or not is based on NEI information using 2% assignment rule. Panel b compares the means of analysis 
sample and excluded sample. The null hypothesis of t-test in Panel b is that the means of the two samples are the same, 
tests results suggest that the analysis sample and excluded sample are statistically similar in terms of market share, 
stock market return, market/book ratio, equity/assets ratio, R&D intensity, leverage, labor productivity, cash flow, and 
profitability.   
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Table 2-13: Descriptive statistics when use regulatory index measure 
Year 
Panel a: Sample with full information for regression 
Mergers Same industry Polluting acquirer Polluting target 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
1996 1,247 541 343 198 357 35 281 25 
1997 1,398 559 329 230 384 35 277 32 
1998 1,339 547 323 224 396 32 235 26 
1999 1,296 532 304 228 380 33 232 32 
2000 1,265 501 313 188 375 23 185 21 
2001 1,365 433 275 158 310 19 185 16 
2002 1,395 397 241 156 279 17 166 17 
2005 1.420 413 256 157 304 11 164 14 
2008 1,403 376 213 163 275 17 148 14 
2011 1,198 299 179 120 228 19 92 11 
Panel b: Comparison of means for analysis sample and excluded sample 
 
Variables 
Analysis Sample Excluded Sample  
ttest of means (p-value) mean obs mean obs 
Market share 0.08 17,924 0.07 15,567 -0.13 (0.90) 
Stock Market Return 0.21 17,924 2.31 11,406 2.83 (0.00) 
Market/book ratio 3.50 17,924 0.95 15,305 -2.48 (0.01) 
Equity/assets ratio 0.21 17,924 -3.77 19,391 -2.60 (0.01) 
Asset growth 0.18 17,924 4.62 14,221 3.74 (0.00) 
R&D intensity 4.79 17,924 6.52 7,381 1.01 (0.31) 
Leverage 0.74 17,924 4.51 19,411 2.59 (0.01) 
Labor productivity 237.50 17,924 245.29 14,811 1.19 (0.23) 
Cash flow -7.25 17,924 -6.07 17,675 0.75 (0.45) 
Profitability -0.12 17,924 -1.30 19,168 -4.96 (0.00) 
Note: Panel a provides description of the structure of M&As in analysis sample, especially the number of mergers, 
the number of mergers in same industry, the number of polluting acquirer and target. Whether an acquirer or a target 
is a polluter or not is based on NEI information using 2% assignment rule. Panel b compares the means of analysis 
sample and excluded sample. The null hypothesis of t-test in Panel b is that the means of the two samples are the same, 
tests results suggest that the analysis sample and excluded sample are statistically similar in terms of market share, 
R&D intensity, labor productivity and cash flow. 
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b. Tables: excluding environmental regulations  
Table 2-14 provide estimated models that are similar to those generally used in finance 
literature focusing on M&As by excluding environmental regulations, in this case PACE, and 
analyzing the same sample when use PACE as a measure of environmental regulations. As shown 
in the table, results are very similar to Harford (2005), though magnitudes vary, signs are the same, 
especially for market share, leverage, and asset growth.  
 
Table 2-14: Non-linear models without PACE as a measure of environmental regulations 
 Logit models (fixed effects) Poisson models (fixed effects) 
 Acquirer Target M&A Acquirer counts Target counts 
Deregulation 0.205 
(0.55) 
-1.243** 
(-1.99) 
-0.052 
(-0.15) 
-0.177 
(-0.62) 
-0.954* 
(-1.95) 
Economic shock 0.011 
(0.20) 
-0.018 
(-0.35) 
-0.036 
(-0.69) 
0.043** 
(2.24) 
0.010 
(0.45) 
Market share 1.508*** 
(3.53) 
0.581 
(1.27) 
1.221*** 
(3.00) 
1.034*** 
(4.13) 
0.260 
(0.89) 
Market/book 0.000 
(0.07) 
0.011*** 
(2.71) 
0.005* 
(1.93) 
0.001 
(0.32) 
0.007*** 
(2.73) 
Equity/asset -0.832 
(-1.03) 
1.578*** 
(3.06) 
1.105** 
(2.48) 
0.338 
(0.50) 
1.670*** 
(3.84) 
R&D intensity -0.001 
(-0.18) 
-0.000 
(-0.10) 
-0.000 
(-0.06) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.000 
(0.32) 
Leverage -0.562 
(-0.67) 
2.570*** 
(4.15) 
1.856*** 
(3.49) 
0.595 
(0.86) 
2.769*** 
(5.41) 
Stock market return -0.014 
(-0.68) 
0.026* 
(1.76) 
0.031* 
(1.65) 
-0.008 
(-0.67) 
0.013 
(1.19) 
Asset growth 0.867*** 
(9.35) 
-0.096 
(-1.18) 
0.450*** 
(6.18) 
0.384*** 
(8.98) 
-0.095 
(-1.41) 
Productivity 0.002*** 
(3.44) 
0.005*** 
(7.55) 
0.005*** 
(7.60) 
0.001*** 
(4.91) 
0.003*** 
(8.53) 
Obs 6,911 6,219 7,804 7,003 6,269 
Note: *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. Corresponding test statistics are in parentheses. 
The estimated models are the same as [2.1] for logit models, and [2.2] for Poisson models, except that environmental 
regulations are excluded, which leads to models close to those in finance literature when analyze M&As. 
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c. Tables: other robustness checks 
When combining CAA redefinitions and pollution information as a measure of 
environmental regulations, we define polluter/non-polluter by setting a threshold of percentage 
emissions, those industries produce pollution above such threshold will be designated as polluter, 
vice versa. In order to identify whether the polluter/non-polluter assignment rule affects the 
estimates or not, we vary such rule to be 7%, which is used in Greenstone (2002), and 2%. Table 
2-15 – 2-18 provide estimated results for both non-linear and linear models for each rule. More 
specifically, Table 2-15 and 2-16 are non-linear models, comparing to Table 2-4, the results are 
with similar pattern. Results of linear models using different rules in Table 2-17 and 2-18 present 
similar pattern to results in Panel b in Table 2-7. 
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Table 2-15: Estimated models when use regulatory index measure (7% rule) 
 Logit models (fixed effects) Poisson models (fixed effects) 
 Acquirer Target M&A Acquirer counts Target counts 
Regulation index -0.053 
(-1.03) 
0.059 
(1.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
0.059** 
(2.34) 
Deregulation -0.321 
(-1.05) 
0.285 
(0.88) 
0.033 
(0.13) 
-0.254 
(-1.31) 
-0.108 
(-0.43) 
Economic shock 0.046 
(0.86) 
-0.015 
(-0.48) 
-0.039 
(-1.35) 
0.040** 
(2.37) 
-0.005 
(-0.28) 
Market share 0.723* 
(1.82) 
-0.780* 
(-1.81) 
0.444 
(1.16) 
0.608*** 
(3.24) 
-0.870*** 
(-3.25) 
Market/book -0.000 
(-0.65) 
-0.000 
(-0.41) 
-0.001 
(-1.16) 
-0.000 
(-0.60) 
-0.000 
(-0.17) 
Equity/asset 0.860 
(1.50) 
0.061 
(0.0.29) 
0.256 
(0.78) 
0.391 
(0.96) 
0.009 
(0.05) 
R&D intensity 0.000 
(0.33) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
-0.000 
(-0.96) 
0.000 
(0.49) 
0.000 
(0.45) 
Leverage 0.511 
(0.86) 
0.069 
(0.33) 
0.260 
(0.79) 
0.146 
(0.35) 
0.016 
(0.09) 
Stock market return -0.033 
(-1.49) 
0.001 
(0.16) 
-0.014 
(-1.10) 
-0.021 
(-1.38) 
0.006 
(1.04) 
Asset growth 0.611*** 
(11.58) 
-0.034 
(-0.78) 
0.384*** 
(9.14) 
0.252*** 
(12.48) 
-0.028 
(-0.82) 
Productivity -0.000 
(-0.59) 
-0.001** 
(2.12) 
-0.000 
(-0.92) 
-0.000** 
(-2.15) 
-0.000** 
(-2.41) 
Obs 8,949 7,345 9,847 9,231 7,440 
Note: *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. Corresponding test statistics are in parentheses. 
The results are based logit and Poisson models when use CAA redefinitions related regulatory index measure, and the 
polluter/non-polluter indicator is assigned using 7% rule, according to which, those industries who produce pollution 
higher than 7% of total emissions of all industries are treated as polluter, otherwise non-polluter. This is the rule that 
is used in Greenstone (2002). 
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Table 2-16: Estimated models when use regulatory index measure (3% rule) 
 Logit models (fixed effects) Poisson models (fixed effects) 
 Acquirer Target M&A Acquirer counts Target counts 
Regulation index -0.027 
(-0.56) 
0.048 
(0.92) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.020 
(0.65) 
0.083*** 
(2.40) 
Deregulation -0.320 
(-1.05) 
0.285 
(0.88) 
0.033 
(0.13) 
-0.254 
(-1.31) 
-0.108 
(-0.44) 
Economic shock 0.047 
(0.87) 
-0.151 
(-0.49) 
-0.039 
(-1.35) 
0.040** 
(2.36) 
-0.001 
(0.948) 
Market share 0.725* 
(1.82) 
-0.780* 
(-1.81) 
0.444 
(1.16) 
0.608*** 
(3.24) 
-0.007 
(-0.37) 
Market/book -0.000 
(-0.65) 
-0.000 
(-0.41) 
-0.001 
(-1.16) 
-0.000 
(-0.60) 
-0.871*** 
(-3.26) 
Equity/asset 0.861 
(1.50) 
0.060 
(0.29) 
0.256 
(0.78) 
0.392 
(0.97) 
-0.000 
(-0.18) 
R&D intensity 0.000 
(0.34) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
-0.000 
(-0.96) 
0.000 
(0.49) 
0.008 
(0.04) 
Leverage 0.513 
(0.86) 
0.068 
(0.33) 
0.260 
(0.76) 
0.149 
(0.35) 
0.015 
(0.08) 
Stock market return -0.033 
(-1.49) 
0.001 
(0.16) 
-0.014 
(-1.10) 
-0.021 
(-1.39) 
0.006 
(1.04) 
Asset growth 0.611*** 
(11.58) 
-0.033 
(-0.78) 
0.384*** 
(9.14) 
0.252*** 
(12.48) 
-0.027 
(-0.81) 
Productivity -0.000 
(-0.60) 
-0.001** 
(-2.12) 
-0.000 
(-0.92) 
-0.000** 
(2.15) 
-0.000** 
(-2.15) 
Obs 8,949 7,345 9,847 9,231 7,440 
Note: *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. Corresponding test statistics are in parentheses. 
The results are based logit and Poisson models when use CAA redefinitions related regulatory index measure, and the 
polluter/non-polluter indicator is assigned using 3% rule, according to which, those industries who produce pollution 
higher than 3% of total emissions of all industries are treated as polluter, otherwise non-polluter.  
 
  
88  
 
 
Table 2-17: Linear models when use regulatory index measure (7% rule) 
 
Acquirer Target M&A Market Value 
M&A 
transactions 
With Percentage, Four Pollutants     
Inter_VOC 0.324** 
(2.29) 
0.140 
(1.15) 
0.332** 
(2.20) 
75127.06* 
(1.76) 
7904.333 
(0.84) 
Inter_NOX -0.068 
(-0.85) 
0.004 
(0.05) 
-0.124 
(-1.46) 
47571.77*** 
(3.16) 
-377.112 
(-0.08) 
Inter_PM10 0.027 
(0.20) 
-0.133 
(-1.14) 
-0.104 
(-0.72) 
46694.96 
(0.89) 
-5153.41 
(-0.73) 
Inter_PM25 -0.232* 
(-1.95) 
-0.106 
(-1.04) 
-0.180 
(-1.42) 
-47812.09 
(-0.91) 
- 
Without Percentage, Four Pollutants    
Inter_VOC 0.234* 
(1.78) 
0.072 
(0.64) 
0.232* 
(1.66) 
85801.1** 
(2.12) 
7802.98 
(0.84) 
Inter_NOX -0.051 
(-0.78) 
0.012 
(0.21) 
-0.086 
(-1.24) 
26773.07* 
(1.67) 
180.173 
(0.03) 
Inter_PM10 0.052 
(0.39) 
-0.113 
(-0.97) 
-0.069 
(-0.48) 
55867.2 
(1.06) 
-5547.296 
(-0.79) 
Inter_PM25 -0.163 
(-1.48) 
-0.078 
(-0.82) 
0.136 
(-1.15) 
-63155.09 
(-1.19) 
- 
With Percentage, combine PM    
Inter_VOC 0.218* 
(1.74) 
0.104 
(0.96) 
0.263** 
(1.97) 
71611.2** 
(2.07) 
3869.33 
(0.56) 
Inter_NOX -0.055 
(-0.85) 
0.020 
(0.35) 
-0.080 
(-1.15) 
22947.46 
(1.47) 
733.879 
(0.15) 
Inter_PM -0.132 
(-1.55) 
-0.143* 
(-1.95) 
-0.181** 
(-1.99) 
-13203.78*** 
(-2.87) 
- 
Without Percentage, Ozone and PM    
Inter_Ozone -0.006 
(-0.11) 
0.030 
(0.60) 
-0.024 
(-0.38) 
12148.08 
(0.78) 
2520.306 
(0.61) 
Inter_PM -0.069 
(-0.91) 
-0.100 
(-1.55) 
-0.101 
(-1.26) 
73154.31** 
(2.31) 
63.743 
(0.01) 
Without Percentage, all in one     
Inter_env -0.050 
(-1.05) 
-0.030 
(-0.74) 
-0.082 
(-1.62) 
35706.1** 
(2.46) 
2584.098 
(1.01) 
Note: *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. Corresponding test statistics are in parentheses. 
The results are based logit and Poisson models when use CAA redefinitions related regulatory index measure, and the 
polluter/non-polluter indicator is assigned using 7% rule, according to which, those industries who produce pollution 
higher than 7% of total emissions of all industries are treated as polluter, otherwise non-polluter. This is the rule that 
is used in Greenstone (2002). Market value is measured by market capitalization calculated by common shares 
outstanding multiplies stock price of fiscal year. For models on acquirer, target and M&A, the number of observations 
in regressions is 17,924, while for market value, it is 4,598, and for M&A transactions, it  is 2,843.  
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Table 2-18: Linear models when use regulatory index measure (3% rule) 
 
Acquirer Target M&A Market Value 
M&A 
transactions 
With Percentage, Four Pollutants     
Inter_VOC -0.059 
(-0.99) 
0.089** 
(1.75) 
-0.058 
(-0.92) 
19060.01*** 
(2.84) 
-3597.744 
(-1.27) 
Inter_NOX 0.100 
(0.97) 
-0.036 
(-0.41) 
0.159 
(1.45) 
8354.274 
(1.50) 
-766.138 
(-0.80) 
Inter_PM10 -0.951*** 
(-2.58) 
0.235 
(0.74) 
-0.5745 
(-1.46) 
20973.24 
(1.44) 
6927.122*** 
(2.71) 
Inter_PM25 0.782** 
(2.18) 
-0.297 
(-0.96) 
0.322 
(0.84) 
9245.38** 
(2.36) 
-31.386 
(-0.11) 
Without Percentage, Four Pollutants    
Inter_VOC -0.050 
(-0.85) 
0.083* 
(1.67) 
-0.048 
(-0.77) 
10223.42 
(1.24) 
-3297.934 
(-1.26) 
Inter_NOX 0.065 
(0.65) 
-0.024 
(-0.27) 
0.130 
(1.21) 
222.854 
(0.04) 
-967.304** 
(-2.29) 
Inter_PM10 -0.918** 
(-2.50) 
0.223 
(0.71) 
-0.545 
(-1.39) 
13060.36 
(0.81) 
6778.235** 
(2.55) 
Inter_PM25 0.812** 
(2.26) 
-0.297 
(-0.96) 
0.344 
(0.90) 
16088.98*** 
(4.58) 
58.259 
(0.62) 
With Percentage, combine PM    
Inter_VOC -0.052 
(-0.89) 
0.082* 
(1.64) 
-0.052 
(-0.83) 
12900.22 
(1.55) 
-1038.817 
(-0.37) 
Inter_NOX 0.029 
(0.30) 
-0.033 
(-0.40) 
0.081 
(0.79) 
2807.6 
(0.65) 
-998.025** 
(-2.49) 
Inter_PM -0.061 
(-0.62) 
-0.063 
(-0.75) 
-0.141 
(-1.36) 
21309.71* 
(1.66) 
4396.905 
(1.59) 
Without Percentage, Ozone and PM    
Inter_Ozone -0.104* 
(-1.85) 
0.038 
(0.79) 
-0.074 
(-1.24) 
10673.77** 
(1.98) 
-1124.149 
(-1.02) 
Inter_PM 0.036 
(0.52) 
-0.073 
(-1.23) 
-0.022 
(-0.29) 
25929.87* 
(1.89) 
3661.708* 
(1.76) 
Without Percentage, all in one     
Inter_env -0.082** 
(-2.30) 
-0.003 
(-0.08) 
-0.089** 
(-2.33) 
20120.42** 
(2.52) 
1730.776 
(1.19) 
Note: *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. Corresponding test statistics are in parentheses. 
The results are based logit and Poisson models when use CAA redefinitions related regulatory index measure, and the 
polluter/non-polluter indicator is assigned using 7% rule, according to which, those industries who produce pollution 
higher than 7% of total emissions of all industries are treated as polluter, otherwise non-polluter. Market value is 
measured by market capitalization calculated by common shares outstanding multiplies stock price of fiscal year. For 
models on acquirer, target and M&A, the number of observations in regressions is 17,924, while for market value, it 
is 4,598, and for M&A transactions, it is 2,843.  
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d. Figures: background information 
 
Figure 2-1 – 2-4 are based on data of percentages of 4-digit SIC industrial emissions to 
total emissions that are used to designate polluter/non-polluter industries for four pollutants by 
each year marked at the top of each sub-graph: NOX, VOC, PM-10 and PM-2.5. As these four 
figures present, very few industries emit more than 7% pollution, thus we also explore 
polluter/non-polluter assignment rules at 2% and 3% to capture as much variation in regulation 
exposure as possible. Data source is NEI. Figure 2-5 provides information about the overall 
impacts of CAA redefinitions. Each sub-graph represents the trend of the number of non-
attainment counties for one specific pollutant marked at the top. Each line in the graph represents 
a specific redefinition of pollutants standard. For example, the red line in Ozone graph is for the 
trend of the number of non-attainment counties under 1997 Ozone pollution standard. And as we 
see from the graph, there is a sharp jump at 2004, thus we can conclude that post 2004, the Ozone 
regulation is overall more stringent. And this is at 2005 for PM. 
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Figure 2-1: Scatter Plot of Percentage 4-digit SIC Polluters for NOX 
 
Figure 2-2: Scatter Plot of Percentage 4-digit SIC Polluters for VOC 
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Figure 2-3: Scatter Plot of Percentage 4-digit SIC Polluters for PM-10 
 
 
Figure 2-4: Scatter Plot of Percentage 4-digit SIC Polluters for PM-2.5 
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Source: EPA Green Book Database (http://www.epa.gov/airquality/greenbook/data_download.html). 
Figure 2-5: Non-attainment Counties by Year and Regulation Vintage for Six Criteria Pollutants  
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Chapter 3: Power and Model Selection for Randomized Experiments: Monte 
Carlo Evidence 
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Abstract: 
An increasingly common approach for identifying the effects of potential and existing 
policy interventions is to use randomized experiments. An often ignored yet important 
consideration when analyzing data from randomized experiments is statistical power: the ability 
to reject a false null hypothesis. This chapter uses Monte Carlo experiments to provide insight on 
how power is influenced by data analysis methods, such as the choice of econometric estimator or 
whether all or a subset of data is used. Surprisingly, except in very few extreme cases, we find that 
power does not vary much if one relies on simple difference-of-means tests or instead on robust 
or structured (i.e. assumption-laden) panel data estimators. However, the simulations provide 
strong evidence of power loss when one uses a subset of the collected data, and power gains 
through the inclusion of non-experimental control variables (e.g. demographic variables). 
Although the structured panel estimator we explore (random effects model), which adheres to the 
underlying data generating process, is in fact the most efficient according to the simulations, we 
find considerable evidence of bias in small samples. The extent of the bias, in combination with 
small efficiency gains, suggests that other approaches may be more appropriate in some settings. 
Although focused on data from randomized experiments, the results are also informative for the 
analysis of observational panel data using quasi-experimental identification approaches. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Many randomized experiments in economics give rise to panel data sets. For instance, the 
effects of a policy intervention in the field may be examined over a number of years; or, even when 
testing a static theory, in the experimental laboratory it is common to repeat the game to achieve 
behavioral convergence. From examining the current state of the literature regarding the analysis 
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of experiment panel data, two observations emerge.32 First, it is common for experimentalists to 
treat the average outcome of the cross-sectional unit (e.g. an individual or a group) as the unit of 
analysis and then perform simple tests, such as t-tests or nonparametric Mann-Whitney tests. The 
potential merit of this approach is that one can avoid econometric models, thus avoiding possible 
specification errors. A second observation is that, when used, econometric models employed tend 
to be conventional ones, making heavy use of random effects and related mixed effects models. 
To an outside observer, the second observation appears at odds with the first. That is, why use such 
a robust approach when using a simple test yet such a structured (i.e., assumption heavy) approach 
when employing econometric modelling? Further, even when panel methods are employed, they 
are often framed as robustness checks and in this sense are relegated to a lower status, with simple 
tests being heavily relied upon to support conclusions drawn. 
In this chapter we use Monte Carlo experiments to provide insight on how the choice of 
analytical methods used to draw inferences affects statistical power, that is, the ability to correctly 
reject a false null hypothesis. This investigation appears especially cogent given the variation in 
methods used to analyze data from randomized experiments. As an ancillary benefit, although 
establishing rules for optimal sample sizes for repeated experiments is beyond the scope of this 
study, the simulations provide insight on the gains in power one achieves through multi-period 
versus one-shot experimental design. This line of investigation can be seen as a complementary to 
recent research in economics and psychology that emphasizes the important role that statistical 
                                              
32 For example, in the survey of laboratory public goods experiments by Chaudhuri (2011), roughly 80% of the studies 
adopt simple (i.e. non regression based) tests based on unit means of all periods or selected periods, or at least use 
such tests to draw their main conclusions; some of these studies employ some panel regression methods as robustness 
checks. Beginning around 2001, researchers have tended to use more panel regression methods but still rely on simple 
tests. 
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power has in advancing proper research conclusions (e.g., List, Sadoff and Wagner, 2011; 
Maniadis, Tufano and List, 2014; Simmons, Nelson and Simonsohn, 2011).33  
In our exploration, we focus on four representative testing approaches for analyzing panel 
data from randomized experiments. Two “simple” approaches included are the Mann-Whitney test 
and simple t-test. Given the panel data, these are implemented by using unit-specific averaged 
outcomes. The other two approaches utilize panel regression methods. The first is a simple OLS 
regression with cluster-robust standard errors. This modelling approach is increasingly used in the 
empirical economics literature in the analysis of quasi-experimental data and, as discussed by 
Wooldridge (2010, p. 915), regression adjustment estimators nonparametrically identify treatment 
effects. In the context of randomized experiments, given the traditional view in experimental 
economics is to favor robust testing procedures, this estimator appears especially relevant; 
specifically, the approach is robust to general forms of heteroskedasticity and within-unit serial 
correlation. The fourth approach is a random effects model. As our simulations consider within-in 
unit serial correlation – inherent to most repeated experiments – we apply Prais-Winsten 
transformations on the data prior to random effects estimation. In fact, the underlying data 
generating process (DGP) we consider is that of a random effects model with within-unit serial 
correlation and so this approach is theoretically efficient. This thus provides a benchmark from 
which to compare the other, more robust, approaches. 
 Within these testing frameworks, we further investigate power differences based on 
whether all or a subset of the data are used. For instance, many studies use only the last period or 
last few periods when drawing inferences (e.g., Anderhub, Engelmann, and Güth, 2002; 
                                              
33 Studies as early as Cohen (1952) point out that the average statistical power in many research studies in psychology 
is too low to ensure the empirical findings are reliable. 
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Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Grosskopf and Sarin, 2010; Duffy and Muñoz-García, 2012). A 
casual observation one can make in this literature is that there are often discrepancies between 
inferences drawn when all versus a subset of data are used. While some of this may stem from 
outcome trends, another possible explanation is that using a subset of data leads to meaningful 
power losses, favoring non-rejection of true null hypotheses. 
Finally, for the regression-based approaches, we investigate the merit of including non-
experimental control variables; e.g., individual or group demographic variables. Such control 
variables are often available in the context of randomized experiments, e.g., through post-
experiment questionnaires in lab experiments or census data in field experiments, and are 
increasingly included to account for possible sampling differences that naturally arise when 
randomizing over small samples. However, through randomization into treatment, control 
variables based on participant characteristics should be uncorrelated with treatment variables, and 
inclusion of controls that help explain outcomes can increase efficiency (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 
927). 
Much to our surprise, our primary result is, ironically, a null finding: except in extreme 
cases, and in the absence of non-experimental control variables, there are generally little 
differences in power between the four testing approaches we investigate. As our design, given the 
assumed DGP, includes the theoretically efficient estimator, one way to interpret this result is that 
there is little cost to using “robust” estimation approaches for experimental panel data. When 
significant control variables are included, however, meaningful power differences do emerge 
between simple and regression-based approaches, however, when significant control variables are 
included. There are further meaningful power losses when one uses a subset of the available data. 
As an ancillary result, we find considerable small-sample bias in the “size” of statistical tests for 
99  
 
 
the random effects estimator; in particular, there is a severe tendency to over-reject a true null 
hypothesis.34 Such small samples arise commonly when group-level data are analyzed. Although 
related small-sample biases for the OLS estimator with cluster-robust standard errors are well-
documented, we find very modest bias, even when the number of clusters is only 10, when one 
uses a limiting distribution based on the number of clusters rather than the sample size, as 
advocated by Cameron and Miller (2015) and others.35 
 
3.2.Monte Carlo Experiments 
3.2.1. Basic setting and data-generating process 
The basic setting we consider can be characterized as a between-subject, multi-period 
experiment with a single binary treatment and equal sample sizes in each treatment. We assume 
that there is within-unit serial correlation across periods. Units are assumed independent. Thus, in 
the event that outcomes are observed at the individual-level and there are no important interactions 
between individuals, the “unit” is best thought of as an individual. Alternatively, if outcomes are 
observed at the group-level and/or there are significant correlations in outcomes among group 
members, the unit is best thought of as the group. The testable hypothesis of interest is whether 
the treatment effect is zero. 
Specifically, the outcome variable, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 , is assumed to follow the DGP:  
[3.1]           𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
                                              
34 To be clear here, the size of a test refers to the probability of rejecting a true null hypothesis. For test statistics with 
the correct “size”, this probability is equal to the significance level one specifies when undertaking the test. 
35 Simulations from some studies (e.g., Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) have given rise to notions that the 
number of clusters needs to be “at least 50” for tests based on this approach to be approximately correct. Such rules 
of thumb are generated based on the use of traditional limiting distributions, e.g., t-distribution with 𝑁𝑇− 𝐾 degrees 
of freedom). 
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where 𝑥1,𝑖𝑡 is a binary treatment indicator; 𝑥2,𝑖 is a time-invariant explanatory variable that may 
be correlated with the outcome but is uncorrelated with treatment; 𝑢𝑖 is a normally-distributed, 
unit-specific random effect; and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a normally distributed, mean-zero error term. Given the 
specification, 𝛽1  is the average treatment effect. We employ the normalization 𝛽2 ≡ 1. . 𝛽0  is 
assumed to be 10, although the choice of 𝛽0 has no impact on the results as long as we include an 
intercept in the regressions. Instead, what matters for power is the size of the treatment effect as 
well as the variation in outcomes in the two treatments. As a simple model of within-unit error 
correlation, the error term is assumed to follow a first-order serial correlation (AR(1)) process: 
[3.2]            𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡  
where 𝜌 is the correlation coefficient.  
In order to make ceteris paribus interpretations across a variety of parameter choices, we 
hold fixed across simulations the variation in outcomes left unexplained by treatment. Denote this 
variance by 𝜎2. Given the model structure and the fact that the sources of variation (𝑥2,𝑖 , 𝑢𝑖 , 𝜀𝑖𝑡) 
are assumed to be additive and independent, we can define this unexplained variance as 𝜎2 =
𝜎𝑥
2 + 𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝜀
2. Let 𝑟1 =
𝜎𝑥
2
𝜎2
, which is the proportion of the variation that can be explained by 𝑥2,𝑖. 
Thus a value of 𝑟1  close to 0 suggests that inclusion of non-experimental controls does little to 
capture unexplained outcome variation. Further, given the definition of 𝑟1 , we can define the ratio 
of between-unit variation to overall unexplained variation as 𝑟2 = 𝜎𝑢
2/(1 − 𝑟1)𝜎
2. It follows that 
we can define the three error components in our DGP as: 36  
[3.3a] 𝜎𝑢
2 = 𝑟2 ∗ (1 − 𝑟1)𝜎
2 
[3.3b] 𝜎𝜀
2 = (1 − 𝑟2 ) ∗ (1 − 𝑟1 )𝜎
2 
                                              
36 ση
2 is derived from the AR(1) process using Yule-Walker methods.  
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and 
[3.3c] 𝜎𝜂
2 = (1 − 𝜌2)(1 − 𝑟2) ∗ (1 − 𝑟1)𝜎
2. 
Further, to complete the DGP we assume the following normal distributions: 
[3.4a] 𝑥2,𝑖~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0, 𝑟1 𝜎
2) 
[3.4b] 𝑢𝑖~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0, 𝑟2 ∗ (1 − 𝑟1 )𝜎
2) 
and 
[3.4c] 𝜂𝑖𝑡~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0, (1 − 𝜌
2)(1 − 𝑟2) ∗ (1 − 𝑟1 )𝜎
2). 
Note that with the assumed distribution for 𝑥2,𝑖 there is zero linear correlation between the control 
variable and the treatment indicator, which would be expected with random treatment assignment. 
Also, importantly, 𝜎2 is held fixed across various values of 𝑟1 , 𝑟2 and 𝜌. We normalize 𝜎
2 ≡ 1. 
Using the DGP, we vary key design parameters as follows. First, the panel dimensions vary 
both in the terms of the total number of units, 𝑁 ∈ {10, 20, 30, 60, 100}  and periods, 𝑇 ∈
{5, 15, 20, 25}. Since 𝑁 is the total number of independent units, there are 𝑁/2 units in each of 
the two treatment samples. Thus,  𝑁 = 10 represents a rather small sample, more characteristic of 
experiments where outcomes are at the group-level (e.g., efficiency, units traded, etc.). We further 
vary the sources of variation unexplained by treatment: the relative between-unit variation, 𝑟2 ∈
{0.0, 0.5, 0.9}; the within-unit serial correlation, 𝜌 = {0.0, 0.5, 0.9}; and, the relative variation 
explained by the control variable, 𝑟1 ∈ {0.0, 0.5, 0.9}.37 Finally, we consider variation in the 
treatment effect size, 𝛽1 ∈ {0, 0.3, 0.6, 0.9, 1, 1.2, 2}.38 Given the normalized σ, what matters is 
the ratio of treatment effect size to σ (Treatment/σ), and in our case such ratio is equal to 𝛽1 . We 
                                              
37 When 𝑟1 = 0.0, no control variable is included.  
38 The choice of 𝛽1 is related to 𝜎. In our case, 𝛽0 is set to be 10, however, assuming normal distribution, the power 
of statistical tests is determined by relative distance of 𝛽1 and 𝛽0, 𝜎, which is normalized to be 1, thus our treatment 
effect can be treated as one standard deviation, two standard deviations, etc. 
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selected 2 as the largest value of 𝛽1  given that values greater than this largely yielded power near 
100%. The number of simulations used for each design cell is 1000. Table 3-1 summarizes the 
deign variables.  
3.2.2. Statistical tests  
Here we provide some additional details of the four testing procedures. First, as a 
representative non-parametric testing procedure, we conduct Mann-Whitney test (M-W, 
hereafter). Since the data are of a simulated panel, we apply the test to unit-specific average 
outcomes, which is common in the literature. We note that although this is a test of medians, given 
the DGP the outcome distributions are symmetric such that the median will equal the mean. 
Second, also based on unit-specific averaged data, we apply simple difference-of-mean t-tests for 
two independent samples (SIMPLE-T). The third approach employs a simple linear regression, in 
tandem with cluster-robust standard errors (OLS-CRSE) where errors are clustered at the unit 
level. A t-test is then applied to the null hypothesis 𝛽1 = 0. As recommended by Bester, Conley, 
and Hansen (2011) and Cameron and Miller (2015), we assume the test statistic has a limiting t-
distribution with 𝐶 − 1 degrees of freedom, where 𝐶 denotes the number of clusters. Fourth, we 
estimate a random effects model (RE) as a representative structured panel regression approach. In 
simulations involving serial correlation, we first apply a Prais-Winston transformation on the data. 
A t-test is then used to test the null hypothesis 𝛽1 = 0, using the standard limiting t-distribution 
with 𝑁𝑇 − 𝐾  degrees of freedom, where 𝐾  denotes the number of estimated regression 
parameters. The simulations are coded in Stata v.13, and testing procedures make use of standard 
Stata commands.39 We use 5% significance levels for all tests.  
                                              
39 The OLS regression is implemented using the “regress” command with the “cluster” option. The random effects 
estimator is implemented using “xtregar”.  
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All four testing procedures lead to theoretically consistent tests given the assumed DGP. 
By construction, the random effects estimator is efficient as it incorporates directly the true 
assumptions about the error structure. Tests based on OLS with cluster-robust standard errors are 
consistent in the presence of within-unit serial correlation (and heteroskedasticity). As the assumed 
unit (random) effects structure is a specific form of within-unit serial, this OLS approach is robust 
to the presence of the random effect. The Mann-Whitney and simple t-tests rely on the assumption 
that units are independent, which is consistent with the DGP. Further, as required by simple t-tests 
the normality assumption holds by construction. 
3.2.3. Calculation of size-adjusted power 
For a valid test, the size of a test, i.e. the probability of rejecting a true null hypothesis, 
should be (approximately) equal to the assumed significance level (here, 5%). Hence, with the 
treatment effect set to 0 we should reject the null hypothesis 𝛽1 = 0 about 5% of the time. There 
are two reasons why the size of simulated tests might differ from the assumed true size in our 
application. One reason is that, with a finite number of simulated values, there will naturally be 
variation introduced by the set of random numbers used in a particular run. Second, both 
regression-based tests are biased, with the bias going to zero as 𝑁 → ∞. For instance, a test with 
incorrect size might reject 10% rather than the assumed 5% of the time. As a result, for any non-
zero treatment effect one will likewise have a tendency to over-reject and this will masquerade as 
increased power.  
We thus compute size-adjusted power when making comparisons to provide a clearer view 
of relative power. In particular, holding fixed the values of other design parameters, we set the 
treatment effect to equal 0 and then identify the critical value from the simulated distribution of 
test statistics; i.e., for a 5% test we rank-order the statistics and identify the 95th percentile of the 
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distribution. This size-adjusted critical value is then used to determine rejections for parallel tests 
based on non-zero treatment effects.  
 
3.3.Results 
In order to illustrate power differences among tests, we provide both power curves and 
pair-wise power differences for informative cases. Each power graph contains multiple sub-graphs 
representing the relationship of statistical power and treatment effect size for a specific case 
defined by (𝑟1 , 𝑟2) denoted at the top of each sub-graph, thus comparing sub-graphs provides 
information about how 𝑟1  and 𝑟2  affect power, ceteris paribus, e.g., Figure 3-1. Power difference 
graphs are similar to power graphs except that power differences graphs are providing information 
about magnitudes of power loss or gains between a pair of tests. To save space, we provide several 
representative cases instead all of them. We also provide, in Table 3-2, summary statistics of power 
differences based on data from the simulations described above. In Table 3-3, we further use 
simulated power data of all cases, and conduct OLS regressions of power and pairwise-power 
differences on the parameters of our experimental design (i.e.,  𝑁, 𝑇, 𝑟2, 𝜌, 𝑟1 , 𝛽1 ). More 
specifically, we employ these graphs and tables to compare simple tests versus regression-based 
tests, tests based on structured versus robust regression models, inclusion of non-experimental 
control variables versus not, and using subsets of data versus using full data set.  
3.3.1. Simple tests versus regression-based tests 
In order to gain insight on the power losses associated with using simple difference-of-
means tests rather than tests based on panel methods, we first compare simple tests (M-W and 
SIMPLE-T) with regression-based tests (OLS-CRSE and RE). As clearly the regression 
approaches have an advantage when meaningful control variables are available and used, we focus 
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here on comparisons without controls, specifically, the first four rows in Table 3-2. Across all 
cases defined by 𝑁, 𝑇, treatment effect sizes (greater than 0), 𝑟1, and 𝑟2 , 𝜌, rows 1-4 establish that, 
on average, there are no meaningful differences between the two simple tests, nor between the 
simple and regression-based tests. Looking at particular cases, given that averaging across all 
design cells can mask important information, we note that there are a few cases where the 
difference is on the order of 10%. Such power loss happens when sample size is small, and when 
the coefficient of AR(1) process 𝜌  is greater than 0. Results in Table 3-3 suggest that when 
comparing non-parametric tests and tests based on panel methods, increasing time periods will 
increase the statistical power, but has little impacts on power differences, ceteris paribus. Though 
there is no meaningful power differences among tests, besides treatment effect size, 𝑟1  and 𝑟2  
affect the power the most among all other parameters. And in general, power of all tests are 
decreasing as between-unit variation increases, ceteris paribus. 
Figure 3-1 and 3-2 demonstrate the largest power differences (all in percentages) among 
M-W, SIMPLE-T, OLS-CRSE, and RE when 𝑟1 = 0. More specifically, Figure 3-1 is the power 
graph of tests for 𝑁 = 10, 𝑇 = 20, 𝑟1 = 0, and each sub-graph is for case (𝜌, 𝑟2) marked at the top. 
Holding 𝜌 constant, and increasing 𝑟2 , the between-unit variation ratio, will decrease statistical 
power for all four tests. Similarly, increasing 𝜌, the serial correlation coefficient, will decrease 
power, ceteris paribus. Though in Figure 3-2, the power loss (gains) of simple tests comparing to 
regression-based tests can be as large as about 10% (11%) when sample size is small, serial 
correlation exists, and most of the variations is from between-unit variations, in general, there are 
no meaningful power differences for most of the cases.  
By convention, the acceptable level of power is 80% (Royall, 1997, p.109-110). Table 3-4 
presents the initial combination of 𝑁 and 𝑇, when 𝛽1  is small, say 0.3, and when simulated power 
106  
 
 
is greater than 80% for each case defined by explanatory power 𝑟1 , between-unit variation 𝑟2, and 
serial correlation 𝜌. For each case, any combination that has 𝑁 greater than that of the initial 
combination, and/or 𝑇 greater than the initial combination will return power higher than 80%. For 
example, when 𝑟1 = 0, increasing either between-unit variation ratio 𝑟2 or 𝜌, the degree of serial 
correlation, we need to increase the sample size by either increasing 𝑁 or 𝑇 to make sure the tests 
can have power of 80% or higher. Those without any combination means that even for 𝑁 = 100, 
power is lower than 80%. From Table 3-4, for small 𝛽1 , the treatment/σ ratio, even in the absence 
of serial correlation, we need to have a sample with at least 60 units participating in a 15-period 
experiment to ensure our tests, either simple tests or regression-based tests, have power greater 
than 80%. However, when 𝛽1   is greater than 0.9, even a very small sample size, e.g. 10 units 
participating repeated experiment 5 times, yields power greater than 80% for all tests, no matter 
how 𝑟1 , 𝑟2  and 𝜌 are defined. 
3.3.2. Tests based on structured versus robust regression models 
We then compare the power of tests using robust regression models (OLS-CRSE) and tests 
based on structured models, in our case, the RE. Theoretically, RE is the correct model that would 
be efficient, however, as illustrated by Vossler (2013), there may be severe size distortions in the 
direction of over-rejecting the null hypothesis.  
3.3.2.1.Size distortions 
Figure 3-3 presents the simulated rejection probabilities (i.e., sizes) of different tests 
for 𝑟1 = 0, and 𝑇 = 15 for varying 𝑁 and combinations of (𝜌, 𝑟2), as indicated at the top of each 
sub-graph. The patterns are similar for other values of 𝑟1 and 𝑇. When 𝜌 = 0, 𝑟2 = 0, which means 
there is no serial correlation and no between-unit variation, all the tests studied in this chapter have 
approximately correct size, lying between 0.04 and 0.06. However, from Figure 3-3, especially 
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when there is between-unit variation, the RE-based approach tends to over-reject the null 
hypothesis when 𝑁 is small. Across all cases, the average size of RE-based tests is about 0.098, 
approximately twice the significance level when 𝑁 = 10. The other three tests return similar and 
approximately correct sizes. When 𝑁  increases, all tests tend to have similar (correct) size, 
especially when 𝑁 is greater than 60. 
3.3.2.2.Power similarity 
The size of tests based on RE have severe small-sample bias, implying that one reason a 
RE might lead to rejection whereas a simple t-test based on CRSE does not is not likely because 
of efficiency but because of bias. However, after adjusting power by size, in general, OLS-CRSE 
and RE have little difference in powers. Row four in Table 3-2 shows that across all cases, the 
average power differences between OLS-CRSE and RE is about -0.22%, which is negligible given 
the variation induced by simulations. The largest power loss from using OLS-CRSE, -10.1%, 
occurs when the sample size is very small, and either there is severe serial correlation, or 𝛽1  is 
small. In our simulation, this is when = 10, 𝑇 = 25, r1 = 0, 𝑟2 = 0, and ρ = 0.9, 𝛽1 > 0.9, or 
when 𝑁 = 10, 𝑇 = 25, r1 = 0, 𝑟2 = 0, and 𝜌 = 0, 𝛽1 = 0.3. This suggests that except in extreme 
cases when the sample size is extremely small, where RE could be slightly more powerful than 
OLS-CRSE, the unstructured panel methods (OLS-CRSE) and structured panel methods (RE) 
have approximately the same power. This can also be found in Figure 3-1 and 3-2, which provides 
as an example of power similarity between OLS-CRSE and RE.  
3.3.3. Inclusion of non-experimental control variables 
We then compare statistical power of tests in tandem with panel models with and without 
control variable to further explore potential advantages of panel methods. When 𝑥2𝑖  has 
explanatory power, which means 𝑟1 > 0, inclusion of a non-experimental control variable will 
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increase the goodness-of-fit of regression models. Figure 3-4 provides an example of the 𝑅2of 
panel models with and without 𝑥2𝑖 when 𝑁 = 10 and 𝑇 = 15; the other cases present a similar 
pattern. Moreover, in terms of power, inclusion of non-experimental control variables can increase 
statistical power. From rows 5 and 6 of Table 3-2, across all cases, average power gains when 
including non-experimental control variables is about 3%, with largest power gains more than 
60%, which is when the sample size is small, and the control variable  𝑥2𝑖 explains 90% of the 
variation in outcomes unexplained by treatment. Figure 3-5 and 3-6 provide power and power 
differences graphs when 𝑁 = 10, 𝑇 = 5, 𝑟1 = 0.9. When treatment effect size is mall, such power 
gains, on average, will be larger, e.g., when  𝛽1 = 0.3, the average power gains is about 5%. 
Increasing sample size will decrease such power gains, ceteris paribus. Moreover, Figure 3-5 
contains M-W and SIMPLE-T demonstrating that simple tests have approximately the same power 
as OLS-CRSE and RE, and tests in tandem with regressions with control variables are superior to 
simple tests. Thus we can conclude that, in general, when one ignores controls that are important 
in explaining outcome variation, there are meaningful power losses. 
3.3.4. Using subsets of data 
Finally, we explore whether using subsets of data leads to meaningful power differences. 
We consider two cases – tests based on using observations from the last period, and tests based on 
the last five periods – and denote the corresponding tests as M-W-Last, M-W-Sub, SIMPLE-T-
Last, SIMPLE-T-Sub, OLS-CRSE-Last, OLS-CRSE-Sub, RE-Last, RE-Sub, and further OLS-
CRSE-Last-Control, OLS-CRSE -Sub-Control, RE-Last-Control, and RE-Sub-Control. M-W-
Last and SIMPLE-T-Last use last period only, whereas, M-W-Sub and SIMPLE-T-Sub are based 
on unit-specific averages constructed from the last five periods. In order to have comparable 
regression-based tests to simple tests using subsets of data, we bring indicators of whether the 
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period is the last period (𝑑𝑙) or not, and whether the periods are the last five periods (𝑑5) or not 
separately to regressions based on the full data set. More specifically, when excluding controls, 
the regression model is  𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑇+𝛽3𝑑𝑇𝑥1,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , where 𝑑𝑇  is 𝑑𝑙  for 
testing the last period, and 𝑑5 for testing the last five periods. And then the relevant test is of the 
null hypothesis:  𝛽1 + 𝛽3 = 0 . Similarly, the regression is 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖 +
𝛽3𝑑𝑇+𝛽4𝑑𝑇𝑥1𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 when including the control variable, and the relevant test is whether: 
𝛽1 + 𝛽4 = 0.  
Rows 7 to 18 in Table 3-2 summarize the power differences between tests using the full 
data set and subsets of data. Using subsets of data, especially using only one period of observation 
will generate meaningful power loss, in some cases such power loss could be as large as 81%, e.g. 
power of SIMPLE-T-Last when compared to SIMPLE-T. Using five periods of data leads to higher 
power than using one period, but still worse than using full data set. See Figure 3-7 – 3-10 for 
relevant examples. When 𝛽1 = 1, across all cases simulated, average power loss of tests based on 
the last period when compared to tests based on full data set is 14.6%, 14.7%, 15.1%, and 12.8% 
for M-W, SIMPLE-T, OLS-CRSE, and RE, respectively. Average power losses of basing tests on 
the last five periods is about 5% for all four testing approaches. Such power losses are even larger 
when 𝛽1 < 1. Increasing 𝛽1  of course increases power of all tests, which leads to differences that 
approach zero for large values. 
 
3.4 Discussion  
The results from the Monte Carlo experiments suggest that in many cases there are rather 
negligible differences in power across the different testing procedures we explored. This thus 
provides some suggestive evidence that, even when more sophisticated regression models are 
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desired, simple tests can be informative without a meaningful loss in power. One exception is 
when control variables are available, and when such controls explain a significant fraction of the 
outcome variation. Here, regression methods have the advantage of increased power. Thus, in 
applications where simple tests support the null hypothesis and regression-based tests (with 
controls) suggest rejection, the latter tests – assuming underlying assumptions are met – are more 
likely to support the correct conclusion. A second exemption is when only a block of the data is 
analyzed, which also can lead to meaningful power losses. Certainly such a practice can be justified 
on the basis of a DGP that varies over time. However, even then, there is potential advantage to 
modelling this process. 
The underlying DGP process explored here of course abstracts from several data issues 
that may be present. 40  For example, the results presented assume homoskedasticity. 
Heteroskedasticity should theoretically decrease the power of all tests considered, although this 
could lead to meaningful differences across tests. In this setting, of course, a t-test based on the 
RE estimator is no longer consistent and the efficient estimator would incorporate both the 
underlying heteroskedasticity and serial correlation processes. One trending estimator in the 
experimental literature is a RE estimator with cluster-robust standard errors, which in our setting 
would lead to a consistent test. However, by definition, this approach is no longer efficient. Further, 
given negligible differences between the RE estimator and OLS with cluster-robust standard errors 
in the homoskedastic case suggests there are unlikely to be efficiency gains with such an approach. 
As suggested by our simulations involving small numbers of cross-section units, the size distortion 
of RE-based tests suggests that OLS with cluster-robust standard errors is likely to be preferred.  
                                              
40 We explored a simple extension to our DGP where the error variance decreased over time. This did not lead to 
any additional variation across testing approaches considered. 
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Other data issues include trending outcomes due to learning or other sources of behavioral 
dynamics. Moreover, the serial correlation process considered in this chapter is AR(1), and we see 
significant impacts of serial correlation on the statistical power of tests, and it even affects the 
power difference between OLS-CRSE and RE negatively. It is not clear whether this is true when 
there are higher-order serial correlation processes. These and other extensions that reflect the 
realities of data from randomized experiments are left as fodder for future explorations. 
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Appendix: Tables and Figures  
Table 3-1: Monte Carlo experiment design variables 
Variable Description 
𝛽1  Treatment effect  
𝜎2 Outcome variance unexplained by treatment  
 𝑟1 Proportion of the unexplained variance captured by non-experimental control 
variable (if present) 
 𝑟2  Proportion of the unexplained variance due to between-unit variation.  
𝜌 Coefficient of within-unit serial correlation 
𝑁 Total number of cross-section units (across both treatments) 
𝑇 Total number of time periods  
 
 
Table 3-2: Average power differences among tests 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
(M-W)−(SIMPLE-T) 0.22 2.27 -6.10 12.2 
(M-W) − (OLS-CRSE) 0.11 2.87 -9.40 11.7 
(M-W) − (RE) -0.11 2.84 -10.3 11 
(OLS-CRSE) − (RE) -0.22 1.06 -10.1 3.70 
(OLS-CRSE) − (OLS-CRSE-Control) -2.56 6.64 -61.8 2.60 
(RE) − (RE-Control) -2.54 6.56 -64.3 3.60 
(OLS-CRSE-Last) − (OLS-CRSE-Last-Control) -18.86 20.28 -70 0 
(RE-Last) − (RE-Last-Control) -18.59 20.20 -75.40 0 
(OLS-CRSE-Sub) − (OLS-CRSE-Sub-Control) -5.65 10.58 -69 2.9 
(RE-Sub) − (RE-Sub-Control) -5.74 10.76 -72.2 2.1 
(M-W) − (M-W-Last) 16.43 19.32 -3.40 80.9 
(SIMPLE-T) − (SIMPLE-T-Last) 16.40 19.67 -2.90 81 
(OLS-CRSE) − (OLS-CRSE-Last) 16.72 19.83 -2.20 80.1 
(RE) − (RE-Last) 14.98 19.14 -3.20 79.10 
(M-W) − (M-W-Sub) 4.93 9.05 -10.2 56.1 
(SIMPLE-T) − (SIMPLE-T-Sub) 5.04 9.14 -5 55.3 
(OLS-CRSE) − (OLS-CRSE-Sub) 5.14 9.22 -2.20 56.6 
(RE) − (RE-Sub) 4.24 8.54 -2.9 52.4 
Note: The number of cases defined by N, T, treatment effect sizes (greater than 0),  r1, and r2 ,ρ is 3,240. 
First four rows are across cases when 𝑟1 = 0, and there are 1,080 cases. Rows 5 – 8 are across all cases 
when 𝑟1 > 0, and there are 2,160 cases. Rows 9 and 10 are across all cases when 𝑟1 > 0 and 𝑇 ≠ 5, and 
there are 1,620 cases. Rows 11 – 14 are based on all 3,240 cases. And the last frou rows are based on cases 
when 𝑇 ≠ 5, and there are 2,430 cases. All power data is adjusted by size, and are in percentages. 
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Figure 3-1: Statistical power of tests for 𝑁 = 10, 𝑇 = 20, 𝑟1 = 0
 
Figure 3-2: Statistical power differences of tests for 𝑁 = 10, 𝑇 = 20, 𝑟1 = 0 
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Table 3-3: Regressions of power and power differences on N, T, 𝛽1 , r1, r2, and𝜌 
                                      Panel a: statistical power of tests 
 M-W SIMPLE-T OLS-CRSE RE 
N 0.242*** 
(0.009) 
0.254*** 
(0.009) 
0.248*** 
(0.009) 
0.243*** 
(0.09) 
T 0.290*** 
(0.040) 
0.278*** 
(0.041) 
0.279*** 
(0.040) 
0.277*** 
(0.040) 
r1  16.682*** 
(0.790) 
16.876*** 
(0.811) 
17.125*** 
(0.799) 
17.083*** 
(0.800) 
𝛽1   23.822*** 
(0.611) 
23.903*** 
(0.621) 
23.627*** 
(0.616) 
23.416*** 
(0.616) 
r2 -11.603*** 
(0.783) 
-11.857*** 
(0.802) 
-11.624*** 
(0.792) 
-12.076*** 
(0.790) 
𝜌 -5.720*** 
(0.788) 
-5.754*** 
(0.809) 
-5.705*** 
(0.796) 
-5.618*** 
(0.795) 
constant 47.009*** 
(1.386) 
46.513*** 
(1.42) 
47.070*** 
(1.412) 
47.846*** 
(1.409) 
 Panel b: statistical power differences of tests 
 (M-W)-(SIMPLE-T) (M-W)-(OLS-CRSE) (M-W)-(RE) (OLS-CRSE)-(RE) 
N -0.012*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.000) 
T 0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.012* 
 (0.006) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
r1  -
(0.086) 
-
(0.109) 
-
(0.111) 
0.042 
(0.041) 
𝛽1  -0.081* 
(0.049) 
0.195*** 
(0.066) 
0.406*** 
(0.067) 
0.211*** 
(0.023) 
r2 0.254** 
(0.082) 
0.021 
(0.106) 
0.473*** 
(0.108) 
0.452*** 
(0.043) 
𝜌 0.035 
(0.085) 
-0.015 
(0.107) 
-0.101 
(0.110) 
-0.087** 
(0.036) 
constant 0.496*** 
(0.132) 
-0.061 
(0.194) 
-0.837*** 
(0.190) 
-0.777*** 
(0.078) 
Note: *, **, *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level separately. All power data is adjusted by 
size, and in percentages. Data when treatment effect size is zero are excluded, since they are actually the 
statistical size of tests, thus number of observations used in regressions is 3,240. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. (M-W) − (SIMPLE-T) is the power difference between Mann-Whitney test and t-test 
based on subject means; (M-W) − (OLS-CRSE) is the power difference between Mann-Whitney test and 
t-test in tandem with CRSE; (M-W) − (RE) is the power difference between Mann-Whitney test and t-test 
in tandem with RE; (OLS-CRSE) − (RE) is the power difference between t-test in tandem with CRSE and 
t-test in tandem with RE. 
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Table 3-4: Initial Combination of N, T when Power > 80%, and 𝛽1 =0.3 
(r1 , r2, 𝜌) M-W SIMPLE-T OLS-CRSE RE 
(0, 0, 0) (20,15) (20,15) (20,20) (20,20) 
(0, 0, 0.5) (60,15) (60,15) (60,15) (60,15) 
(0, 0, 0.9) - - - - 
(0, 0.5, 0) - - - - 
(0, 0.5, 0.5) - - - - 
(0, 0.5, 0.9) - - - - 
(0, 0.9, 0) - - - - 
(0, 0.9, 0.5) - - - - 
(0, 0.9, 0.9) - - - - 
(0.5, 0, 0) (20,20) (20,20) (20,15) (20,15) 
(0.5, 0, 0.5) (30,20) (30,20) (30,20) (30,20) 
(0.5, 0, 0.9) (100,20) (100,20) (100,15) (100,15) 
(0.5, 0.5, 0) (100,15) (100,15) (100,5) (100,15) 
(0.5, 0.5, 0.5) (100,15) (100,15) (100,15) (100,15) 
(0.5, 0.5, 0.9) - - - - 
(0.5, 0.9, 0) - - - - 
(0.5, 0.9, 0.5) - - - - 
(0.5, 0.9, 0.9) - - - - 
(0.9, 0, 0) (20,20) (20,20) (20,15) (20,15) 
(0.9, 0, 0.5) (20,25) (20,20) (20,20) (20,20) 
(0.9, 0, 0.9) (30,25) (30,20) (30,20) (30,20) 
(0.9, 0.5, 0) (30,20) (30,20) (30,20) (30,20) 
(0.9, 0.5, 0.5) (30,20) (30,20) (30,20) (30,20) 
(0.9, 0.5, 0.9) (60,15) (60,15) (60,15) (60,15) 
(0.9, 0.9, 0) (60,15) (60,15) (60,15) (60,15) 
(0.9, 0.9, 0.5) (60,15) (60,15) (60,15) (60,15) 
(0.9, 0.9, 0.9) (60,15) (60,15) (60,15) (60,15) 
Note: Each cell from column 2 to 5 represents a combination of (N, T) when under situation (𝑟1 ,𝑟2, 𝜌) the 
power of tests studied is greater than 80%.  
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Figure 3-3: Size of tests when 𝑇 = 15, 𝑟1 = 0 
 
Figure 3-4: R-squares of panel models when N=10, T=15 
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Figure 3-5: Statistical power of tests for 𝑁 = 10, 𝑇 = 5, 𝑟1 = 0.9 
 
 
Figure 3-6: Statistical power differences of tests for 𝑁 = 10, 𝑇 = 5, 𝑟1 = 0.9 
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Figure 3-7: Statistical power of M-W when N=10,𝑇 = 15, 𝜌 = 0.5 
 
 
Figure 3-8: Statistical power of SIMPLE-T when N=10,𝑇 = 15, 𝜌 = 0.5 
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Figure 3-9: Statistical power of OLS-CRSE when N=10,𝑇 = 15, 𝜌 = 0.5 
  
Figure 3-10: Statistical power of RE when N=10,𝑇 = 15, 𝜌 = 0.5 
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Conclusion 
Panel data methods are widely used in empirical analysis, this project is aiming at analyzing 
regulatory impacts using panel data. More specifically, in order to gain new insight on this 
question, and in contrast to related work, Chapter 1 employs dynamic panel models that allow for 
potential feedback effects (i.e. reverse causality) between measures of performance and regulation. 
This is an important empirical question for both policy makers and firms is whether more stringent 
environmental regulations have positive or negative impacts on firm performance. Specifically, 
Chapter 1 uses data from the U.S. manufacturing industry to explore the effects of the Clean Air 
Act (CAA) on firm performance outcomes related to profitability, employment, and capital 
expenditures. The evidence suggests that feedback effects are present in the data and, more 
critically, appropriately modeling these effects can alter conclusions regarding the effects of 
environmental regulation. Empirical results support the notion that more stringent environmental 
policies can provide dividends to regulated firms. 
Chapter 2 uses insights from both the environmental economics literature and the broader 
finance literature to investigate whether existing findings are sensitive to the omission of these key 
financial variables. Using comprehensive firm-level panel data and a variety of estimation 
frameworks, this chapter provides new evidence suggesting that stringency of environmental 
regulation motivates mergers among regulated firms. Using two measures of environmental 
regulations, pollution abatement costs and expenditures (PACE) and combination of emissions 
and Clean Air Act (CAA) pollution redefinitions, we find that every 10 million 1995 dollars 
increase in PACE will have positive marginal impact, about 0.7%, on the probability of being 
acquirer, and such marginal impacts are 0.2% and 0.3% on being target and being involved in 
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M&A activities separately. Moreover, firms under more stringent environmental regulations tend 
to behave as target firms more frequently. 
An increasingly common approach for identifying the effects of potential and existing 
policy interventions is to use randomized experiments. An often ignored yet important 
consideration when analyzing data from randomized experiments is statistical power: the ability 
to reject a false null hypothesis. Chapter 3 uses Monte Carlo experiments to provide insight on 
how power is influenced by data analysis methods, such as the choice of econometric estimator or 
whether all or a subset of data is used. Surprisingly, except in some extreme cases, we find that 
power does not vary much if one relies on simple difference-of-means tests or instead on robust 
or structured (i.e. assumption-laden) panel data estimation. However, the simulations provide 
strong evidence of power loss when uses a subset of the collected data, and power gains through 
the inclusion of non-experimental control variables (e.g. demographic variables). Although the 
structured panel estimator we explore (random effects model), which adheres to the underlying 
data generating process, is in fact the most efficient according to the simulations, we find 
considerable evidence of bias in small samples. The extent of the bias, in combination with small 
efficiency gains, suggests that other approaches may be more appropriate in some settings. 
Although focused on data from randomized experiments, the results are also informative for the 
analysis of observational panel data using quasi-experimental identification approaches. 
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